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ACADEMIC DISCOURSE AND
PROPRIETARY RIGHTS: PUTTING
PATENTS IN THEIR PROPER PLACE
MARGO A. BAGLEY *
Abstract: This Article provides a fresh perspective on the Bayh-Dole de-
bate by focusing on the impact of patent novelty rules on academic dis-
course. The Article proposes that to begin to reverse an observed dete-
rioration in disclosure norms, flexibilities must be built into the patent
system so that patents can be facilitators of the academic knowledge dis-
semination enterprise. In particular, the Article advocates creation of an
opt-in extended grace period that would provide more time for aca-
demic researchers to publish and present early-stage research before
having to file a patent application. Such an extension, coupled with
early application publication, would both address third-party needs for
notice of proprietary claims and allow researchers to engage in tradi-
tional academic discourse while they retain the ability to obtain proprie-
tary rights useful for commercialization of their inventions.
INTRODUCTION
By most measures, the numbers are pretty impressive. In fiscal
year 2004 alone, approximately 154 U.S. universities reaped over $1
billion in net patent licensing income, executed 3928 new licenses,
and were issued over 3800 U.S. patents, largely as a result of univer-
sity-industry technology transfer initiatives.' By comparison, in 1991,
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MARY ii, 22, 26 (Ashley J. Stevens et al. eds., 2005), available, at http://www.autni.net/
events/File/FYD4%20Licensing%20Survey/04AUTM-USLicSrvy-public.pdf.
217
218	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:217
ninety-eight universities garnered a mere $123 million in gross licens-
ing income.2
 These funds provide needed revenue to university cof-
fers,5
 stimulate economic growth in surrounding municipalities, 4 and
provide beneficial products to consumers here and abroad. 5
But these achievements have not come without a cost to acade-
mia. Historically, universities have existed for the purpose of promot-
ing inquiry and advancing the sum of human knowledge. 6 To further
these goals, university researchers would publish and present their
scientific findings as soon as possible in accordance with communal
norms promoting the prompt and open sharing of data. But today,
academic researchers are being encouraged by technology transfer
offices ("TTOs") and industry sponsors to delay publishing and pre-
senting their work until after filing a patent application and some-
times even longer than that.? In addition, the growth in patent-related
2
 ASS'N OF UNIV. nu'. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY 1991—FY 1995: Fly':
YEAR SURVEY SUMMARY 10, 14 (Daniel E. Massing ed., 1996), available at http://www.
autm.net/events/File/Surveys/91-95AUTMLicSurveyPublic.pdf.
3
 For example, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARE"), which handles
technology transfers for the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has contributed approxi-
mately $750 million to fund basic research at the university over the past eighty years. See
Patent Law Reform: Hearings Before the Subccmim. an Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property
of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Patent Law Reform Hear-
ings] (statement of Carl Gulbrandsen, Managing Director; WARF).
4
 The impact on state and local economies can be quite important. The Wisconsin
Alumni Foundation also boasts that "No date, more than 30 companies based on WARF
technology have spun out of the university, with all but one of them based in Wisconsin."
Guide Offers Aid to Campus Entrepreneurs, UNIV. OF 'WIS.-MADISON NEWS, Apr. 14, 2004,
http://www.news.wisc.edu/9666.huul.
5
 The website of the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM") contains
a list of "product stories" describing successful university-generated products and programs
that spans more than twenty-five pages. See Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers, Product Stories,
littp://www.atitmaiet/aboutTT/abottaT_prodStory.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
6 Am. ASSN or UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Academic Tenure, in Poiicv DOCUMENTS & REPORTS app. 1, at 295 (9th ed. 2001). The two
other purposes are "to provide general instruction to the students" and "to develop ex-
perts for various branches of the public service." Id.; see Charles C. Caldart, Industry Invest-
ment in University Research, 8 Sm. Tacit. & HUM. VALUES 24, 30-31 (1983) (noting a funda-
mental tension between the proper role of universities and the profit motive).
7 See, e.g., Laura Heisler, Be Aware: Public Disclosure Can Affect Patentability, WARF NEwst.
(Wis. Alumni Research Found., Madison, Wis.), Winter 2005, at 1, available at http://www.
warforg/news/news.jsp?news_id=175  (warning about losing patent rights as a result of
disclosing research results); Lauren Maclanahan, Things to Know About Public Disclosures,
TECH. TRANSFER Buzz (Ga. Tech Research Corp., Office of Tech. Licensing, Atlanta, Ga.),
Fall 2004, at 6, available at http://otl.gtrc.gatech.edu/OTL Fall_2004.pdf (same); Lana M.
Knedlik, Publishing: How Your Rights Could Perish (Sept 2, 2004), http://www.stinson
moheck.com/legalpublications/smhlupageasp?key=65 ("Whether you are a sophisticated
university or a lone inventor, the point is that publishing your work may not always be a
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litigation involving universities 8
 and the much-hyped "tragedy of the
anticommons" in the patenting of basic research tools are both costs
attributable, at least in part, to technology transfer initiatives. 8
 While
not amenable to precise quantification, the stifling of discourse and
the erosion in the norms of sharing and colloquy historically associ-
ated with the scholarly enterprise are costs that must be balanced
against the technology transfer gains.i°
Both the impressive numbers and the negative side effects arc
usually traced to the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which allows universities to
elect ownership of inventions developed with federal funds, enabling
them to offer exclusive licenses to companies interested in commer-
cializing the inventions." The impetus for Bayh-Dole was a belief that
good idea.... [U]niversity researchers should be careful about making.any sort of public
disclosure or risk losing patent rights (and ability to profit from them) forever.").
ti See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Wiley Organics, Inc., 125 Fed.
Appx. 291, 292-94 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1328-
29 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Univ. of Rochester v. C.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eli Kinitsch, irate
Wins Suit Against Nobel Laureate, Sci.NOW, Feb. 14, 2005, littp://sciencenow.sciencemag.
orgicgi/content/ful1/2005/214/1.
9 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To
Do AlsouT IT 64-68 (2003) (discussing Madey Ia Duke and the patenting of research tools);
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 701 (1998) (explaining the effect of the tragedy of the
anticommons in biomedical research).
1° See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Re-
search, 66 TEX. L. REV, 1363, 1374-84 (1988) (discussing sponsored research agreement
restrictions on dissemination of academic results); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Re-
search: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 79 (1999)
(noting that changes in intellectual property law have undermined scientific research
norms). Other costs, also difficult to quantify, include the loss to U.S. universities and the
domestic economy of jobs and industry research funds as U.S. companies, frustrated by
the difficulty of working with U.S. university -170s, send jobs and dollars to overseas insti-
tutions with their growing corps of highly skilled researchers. See, e.g., Wayne C. Johnson,
Globalization of Research and Development in a Federated World, in REINVENTING THE RES EA RC] I
UNIVERSITY 159, 164 (Luc E. Weber & James J. Duderstacit eds., 2004) (""[L]arge U.S.
based corporations have become so disheartened and disgusted with the situation [i.e.,
negotiating intellectual property rights with U.S. universities] they are now working with
foreign universities, ... which are more than willing to offer extremely favorable intellec-
tual property terms.'") (alteration in original) (quoting R. Stanley Williams, Hp Fellow for
Hewlett-Packard Laboratories); ROBERT KILLOREN & SUSAN B. BUTS, NATIONAL ACADEMIES
GOVERNMENT-UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ROUNDTABLE, INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY RE-
SEARCH IN OUR TIMES 1 24 (2003), http://www7.nationalacademies.org/guirr/ip_back-
ground.html
 (noting competition for industrial funding from European technical universi-
ties).
" See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212, 301-307). Of course there are myriad factors that have contributed
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the ivory tower was stuffed with useful technologies that could meet
societal needs and stimulate economic progress if appropriate incen-
tives—for example, exclusive rights—could be provided for private
industry to commercialize them. 12
 Although not without critics, Bayh-
Dole is widely seen as a success, and many foreign countries are im-
plementing changes to their laws to mirror its policies. 13
Bayh-Dole and other enabling legislation are evidence of a con-
gressional desire to facilitate technology transfer between universities
and industry by using patent policy, with the ultimate goal of
benefiting the public. 14
 But luring academics into this brave new
world of patents and royalties has created some unintended side ef-
fects. For example, university research often progresses in stages, and
the traditional model of scholarly discourse involves the presentation
and publication of research conclusions and insights at those various
stages. Yet the rigid patent novelty rules directly conflict with this
model by requiring an inventor to file a patent application either be-
fore or within twelve months of exposing the invention to the public
(depending on the country) to avoid losing the right to obtain a pat-
ent. 15
 These rules constrain researcher behavior in ways that are not
conducive to academic discourse.
to the technology transfer boom, including reductions in federal and state funding to uni-
versities, the influence of corporate America on universities, and advances in technology
such as the discovery of DNA and the creation of the field of biotechnology. A full discus-
sion of all such factors is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on patent-related
impacts to technology transfer.
12
 See NIH: Moving Research from the Bench to the Bedside: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108 Cong. 3 (2003) [hereinafter From the
Bench to the Bedside] (statement of Sherrod Brown, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce) ("Congress has long recognized that the value of an idea is in using it.").
13
 See, e.g., Patent Law Reform Hearings, supra note 3, at II (statement of Carl Gulbrandsen,
Managing Director, WARF) ("At WARF, we receive numerous visitors each year from around
the world. Invariably, our foreign visitors ask about Bayh-Dole and express the wish that their
own countries would adopt such forward-thinking legislation."); Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MAN-
AGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2003 SURVEY SUMMARY 2 (Ashley J. Stevens & Frances
Toneguzzo eds., 2004), available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/Surveys/03_Abridged_
Survey.pdf (citing announcements by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and japan of
investment programs and/or statutory changes to enhance the commercialization of re-
search from academic institutions as the countries "continue to strive to emulate U.S. success
in harnessing the intellectual output of its academic institutions").
14 Congress's most recent effort in this area, the Cooperative Research and Technol-
ogy Enhancement Act of 2004 (the "CREATE Act"), is designed to encourage research
collaborations between academic institutions and private enterprises by making it easier
for the partners to obtain patents on inventions created by joint inventors from both or-
ganizations. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
15
 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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The unforgiving nature of patent novelty rules encourages a cul-
ture in which the dissemination of even very early-stage research,
sometimes no more than a proof of concept, is delayed while a provi-
sional patent application is prepared by the university TTO. As a re-
sult, secrecy is on the rise among academic researchers, particularly in
the life sciences, with many university scientists choosing to limit or
delay disclosures of their work in order to participate in the patent/
technology transfer arena." For example, in 1966, 50% of surveyed ex-
perimental biologists felt safe in sharing information on current re-
search with others; only 26% felt that way by 1998) 7
 In a recent study
of geneticists, 35% perceived academic scientists as somewhat or
much less willing to share information and data than a decade ago.
Also, 58% reported adverse data withholding effects on their own re-
search, and 56% reported adverse data withholding effects on the
education of students and post-doctoral researchers."
While these statistics are troubling, other judicial, legislative, and
commercial developments point toward an even bleaker future for
academic discourse in the sciences. The recent decision by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In re Klopfenstein seems sure to
result in a further stifling of scholarly discourse prior to the filing of
patent applications." There, the court expanded the scope of patent-
invalidating prior art by broadly interpreting the phrase "printed pub-
lication" to include even ephemeral scientific poster presentations. 2°
The decision is significant because previous caselaw had required the
distribution of at least some copies or the indexing and cataloguing of
at least one physical copy of a reference before such information
would be considered patent-defeating prior art.21 On the legislative
la See, e.g., Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33
J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 75-79 (2004) (presenting data on the increased secretiveness of univer-
sity researchers between 1980 and 1990); John P. Walsh & Wei Hong, Correspondence,
Secrecy Is Increasing in Step with Competition, 422 NATURE 801, 802 (2003).
17 Walsh & Hong, supra note 16, at 802.
12
 Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a National
Survey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASSN 473, 478 (2002). This is not to suggest that increasing secrecy
is solely, or even predominantly, the result of the patent novelty rules. There are a variety
of contributing factors, such as the widespread inclusion of secrecy clauses in industry
sponsorship agreements and the increasingly competitive nature of academic research in
general. Nevertheless, the potential of the patent novelty rules to encourage this kind of
behavior cannot be ignored.
19 See 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
99 Id.
21
 See, e.g., In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that student
theses were not a printed publication because they had nut been either cataloged or in-
dexed in a meaningful way"); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a
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front, recently introduced patent reform measures, which include the
creation of a "winner takes all" race to the patent office and the
elimination of the best mode requirement, promise a further deterio-
ration of the traditional sharing norms of university researchers while
offering little if any concomitant benefit to this group of inventors."
Moreover, Emory University's recent announcement of its $540 mil-
lion sale of intellectual property, considered to be the largest such
sale in the hitory of American higher education, is likely to fan fur-
ther the flames of interest in technology transfer initiatives at other
institutions hoping to obtain new funds for various endeavors."
Much has been written on the myriad problems associated with
the Bayh-Dole Act and the over-zealous patenting, litigation, and li-
censing practices of some university TTOs, along with the resulting
access issues for upstream research tools, increased secrecy among uni-
versity scientists, and more.24
 To address these perceived problems,
dissertation was a printed publication when there existed exactly one cataloged copy in a
university library); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Forth', 774 F.2d 1109, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding that a scientific paper was prior art because between fifty and 500 interested per-
sons were told of its existence, and the document itself was "disseminated without restric-
tion to at least six persons").
22
 See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (first to file); id.
§ 4 (best mode). In theory, changing from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file regime
would tend to hinder the sharing of research results by creating perverse incentives for
competitive conduct in the race to the patent office (for instance, competitors rushing to
patent non-obvious variants of an inventor's disclosed discovery to narrow the scope of
protection to which she might otherwise be entitled). The current "best mode" require-
ment obligates inventors to disclose in their patent applications the best methods of which
they are aware for practicing the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Elimination of the
requirement thus would make it easier for an inventor to share less information about the
discovery with the interested public.
25 See Clifton Leaf, The Law of Unintended Consequences, FORTUNE, Sept. 19, 2005, at 250,
252.
24 See, e.g., DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL. INNOVATION: UNI-
VERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN
THE UNITED STATES 127-59 (2004) (surveying the effects of Bayh-Dole on research and
patenting processes in American universities); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and
Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1663, 1726 (1996) (positing that the patenting of upstream research tools calls into
question the appropriateness of public funding to support that research); Clovia Hamil-
ton, University Technology Transfer and Economic Development: Proposed Cooperative Economic
Development Agreements Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 397, 415 (2003) (not-
ing that critics of Bayh-Dole charge that it distorts the direction of basic academic research
toward commercially promising subjects); Scott D. Locke, Patent Litigation over Federally
Funded Inventions and the Consequences of Failing to Comply with Bayh-Dole, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3,
15 (2003) (proposing that a recipient of federal funds who fails to comply with the re-
quirements of Bayh-Dole should be divested of title to any patents funded by the public);
Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration that Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of
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several commentators have called for reformation of the Act, 25 as well
as other changes to the patent system, such as heightening the subject
matter and utility standards and creating a statutory experimental use
exception to patent infringement.26
 These proposals could, if imple-
mented, improve some aspects of the current university patenting re-
gime." Even if enacted, however, such reforms likely would have little,
if any, effect on the increase in secrecy among academic researchers
because they do not address the underlying causes of that problem.
I contend that a more promising mechanism for addressing the
deterioration in disclosure norms in academia would be to build
flexibility into the novelty rules of U.S. and foreign patent systems.
This would tailor the patent system to accommodate the needs, val-
Fundamental Science Is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HAttv. J.L. & Them 375, 383-84
(2000) (suggesting that the exclusive licening of technology developed with federal funds
impermissibly limits access to research tools); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bay h-D ale
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. Pmts. 289, 291 (2003) (arguing
for the reformation of Bayh-Dole to give funding agencies greater discretion in mandating
the non-exclusive licensing of federally funded inventions); Diane M. Sidebottom, Updat-
ing the Bayh-Dole Act: Keeping the Federal Government on the Cutting Edge, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J.
225, 236-37 (2001) (explaining that the government requires greater flexibility than Bayh-
Dole allows in order to negotiate technology licenses that are attractive to industry); Leaf,
supra note 23, at 268 (arguing for the amendment of Bayh-Dole to require broad licensing
of federally funded inventions); Gary Stix, Razing the Tollbooths, Sm. AM., Apr. 2003, at 37
(same).
25 See Hamilton, supra note 24, at 417 (proposing amendments to Bayh-Dole to pro-
mote collaboration between universities, local planning agencies, and managers of venture
funds and industry leaders); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 291 (arguing for the ref-
ormation of Bayli-Dole to give funding agencies greater discretion in mandating the non-
exclusive licensing of federally funded inventions); Siclebottom, supra note 24, at 236-37
(arguing that Bayh-Dole should provide the government greater flexibility to negotiate
technology licenses that are attractive to industry).
2S See, e.g., Cynthia D. Lopez-Beverage, Should Congress Do Something About Upstream
Clogging Caused by the Deficient Utility of Expressed Sequence Tag Patents?, 10 1 Their. L. & Pot.'v
35, 92 (2005); Richard R. Nelson, Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise of Patenting at Ameri-
can Universities, 261 Their. TRANSFER 13, 18 (2001); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 91 Am. Setr.r.rtsT 52, 56 (2003).
27
 Baylt-Dole's perceived successes have made it quite popular with members of Con-
gress, universities, and interest groups, and more than minimal changes to the current Act
seem unlikely in the near future. For example, patent reform legislation currently pending
before Congress does not include meaningful changes to Bayh-Dole. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the CREATE Act of 2004 provided the ideal opportunity for
Congress to address problems with the Bayh-Dole Act because the legislation specifically
related to enhancing the Act's technology transfer mandate, yet none of the above-
mentioned commentator reforms were included in that legislation. Instead, the Bayh-Dole
Act was uniformly praised in congressional remarks. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. 52559 (daily
ed. Mar. 10, 2004) (statements of Sens. Hatch and Leahy). In fact, Congress recently cele-
brated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Bayh-Dole with a resolution praising the achieve-
ments made possible by the Act. H.R. Con. Res. 319, 109th Cong. (2005).
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ties, and realities of academic enterprises, and would permit academic
researchers more freedom to share publicly their results. Surprisingly
little, if any, real attention has been focused on modifying these rules
that, along with restrictive terms in industry sponsorship agreements,
are at the root of the increased secrecy permeating academia today.
Twenty-five years after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, patents and
technology transfer are firmly entrenched in academia, 28 but instead
of being a simple aid to the dispersion and implementation of univer-
sity discoveries, patent rules too often are dictating the pace, form,
and scope of discourse and sometimes even the direction of the re-
search itself. In a society that values the public benefits created both
by prompt and open scholarly discourse and by the patenting of
commercializable inventions, these developments are particularly trou-
bling. In the interest of the public good, researchers should not have
to choose between engaging in early-stage academic discourse and ob-
taining proprietary rights.
I suggest that to begin reversing the observed deterioration in
disclosure norms, flexibility must be built into the patent system so
that patents can facilitate, not control, the academic knowledge dis-
semination enterprise. In particular, I advocate the creation of an opt-
in extended grace period that would provide more time for academic
researchers to publish and present early-stage research before having
to file a patent application. Such an extension, coupled with early ap-
plication publication, would allow researchers to engage more fully in
traditional academic discourse while retaining the ability to obtain the
proprietary rights necessary for commercialization of their inventions.
Importantly, this kind of extension also would provide early disclosure
of discoveries for other scientists to build upon.
Part I of this Article provides a context for discussing issues relat-
ing to academic discourse and proprietary rights by highlighting key
changes in the historical relationship between the academy and the
public good prompted by the intrusion of proprietary rights. 29
 Part II
then considers the impact of changes in patent law and policy on sci-
29 See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1726-27 (noting that "Rpm present policy of pro-
moting patents on Federally-supported inventions has become rapidly entrenched in U.S.
law" and that "Neu -eating from the policy may be difficult at this stage. Research per-
formers have adjusted to the incentives created by current policy. When government pol-
icy creates and distributes new property rights, it is inevitable that someone will protest if
those rights are later taken away.").
29 See infra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
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entific discourse in the academy.30
 It looks first at positive benefits cre-
ated by the changes and then at several of the costs engendered by the
patent and technology transfer boom within U.S. universities in the
twenty-five years since the enactment of Bayh-Dole. Proposals for put-
ting patents in their proper place are the focus of Part III. 31
 This Part
proposes the enactment of a statutory amendment designed to amelio-
rate the effects of patent prior art rules on the dissemination of early-
stage university research by allowing university researchers the option
of an extended prior art grace period in exchange for immediate ap-
plication publication. 32
 This proposal aims to increase prompt and full
academic discourse, while balancing a researcher's ability to obtain
patent protection with third-party needs for certainty regarding pub-
licly available information. Part III also addresses controversial aspects
of the proposals, including their relation to current patent reform and
harmonization efforts under consideration in the United States and
abroad.33
 The Article concludes that for norms of scientific scholarly
discourse to regain traction in the academy, patents must move out of
the limelight and into the supporting role that is their proper place. 34
I. THE ACADEMY AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and
not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution
as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and
its free exposition."
This statement reflects the traditional view of universities as institu-
tions dedicated to the advancement of the common good. 36
 This ad-
vancement or "progress" requires "complete and unlimited freedom to
pursue inquiry and publish its results. Such freedom is the breath in
50 See infra notes 56-157 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 158-229 and accompanying text.
52
 See infra notes 163-200 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 201-29 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
s5 AM. ASS'N or UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Timor, With 1970 Interpretive Comments, in POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 6, at 3.
36 See id. There are many ways in which universities have contributed to the public
good in the United States and abroad throughout history. The contributions of American
universities to industry, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and local community development,
as well as the training of a skilled workforce, are well documented. A useful discussion of
this topic is provided in MOWERY ET Al.., supra note 24, at 9-34.
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the nostrils of all scientific activity."37
 Academic freedom manifests itself
in scholarly articles, books, and presentations that are useful for the
researcher (for example, in getting a job or achieving tenure) and for
the interested academic or industry audience seeking to build on that
researcher's work.
A. Historical Norms
Historically, researchers choosing an academic career made a clear
choice for academic freedom over monetary reward:
The professor opts to forgo the fast-paced and often stressful
environment found in an industrial research and development
department and the high salary that accompanies that posi-
tion. Instead, professors are attracted to the chance to pursue
similar interests in an academic arena where they are also en-
dowed with freedom to research topics of their choice 9s
Thus in academe "[i]deas, research, and writing are the currency"39
that, in conjunction with academic freedom and the other intangible
benefits of publication and discovery, historically have made the aca-
demic enterprise rewarding for researchers. This is not to say that
academics were completely altruistic and unselfish in their efforts.
Rather, the "public credit and kudos" accruing to authors of impor-
tant scientific publications have provided incentives for early publica-
tion of scientific discoveries since Henry Oldenburg introduced the
37 Am. ASSN or UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 6, 'in POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS
app. 1, at 295 (9th ed. 2001). For a cogent argument that the concept of academic auton-
omy unfettered by university administration is no longer tenable in a Bayli-Dole or spon-
sored research environment, see Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1404. Professor Rebecca S.
Eisenberg contends:
The traditional American conception of academic freedom, with its emphasis
on defending the professional autonomy of individual faculty members
against universities, is ill-adapted to the task of protecting academic values in
sponsored research within universities. Research sponsors having interests at
odds with traditional academic values may use the lure of research funding to
entice academic scientists into serving their interests.... It makes little sense
to immunize faculty members from institutional supervision and control in
their relationships with research sponsors if faculty members cannot be
counted on to uphold academic values on their own.
Id.
Sandip H. Patel, Note, Graduate Students' Ownership and Attribution Rights in Intellec-
tual Properly, 71 IND. U. 481, 499 (1995).
" Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Au-
thorship, 42 S. TVA. L. Rev. 467, 477-78 (2001).
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journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London in 1665.4°
Of course, the public has benefited from this norm of open disclosure
as well. As noted by the National Academy of Science's Committee on
Responsibilities of Authorship in the Biological Sciences:
[-Me power of the principles first established by Henry
Oldenburg and the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Soci-
ety in 1665 remain undiminished: The rewards of publication
counterbalance inclinations to secrecy. Oldenburg's simple
idea created an ethic of open disclosure of scientific results
that has lasted for centuries and served to move science for-
ward.41
Prompt dissemination of research hypotheses, results, and meth-
odologies through scientific presentations and publication has pro-
vided the foundation for advances and discoveries in numerous sci-
entific fields that have benefited humanity. 42
 The sociologist Robert
Merton characterized academic scientific research as a communal en-
terprise with free sharing and critiquing of results among community
members.43
 As one commentator explains:
The speed of progress is greatly enhanced by virtue of the
fact the practitioners of science publish not only results, but
methodology, and techniques. . . . This not only helps 'boot-
strap' others into the field, to learn from the example set,
but makes it possible for others to verify or refute the results
(or techniques) under investigation.44
40
 See Matthew Rimnter, Japonica Rice: Intellectual Property, Scientific Publishing and Data-
sharing, 23 PROMETHEUS 325,326 (2005).
41 COMM. ON REst ,oNsinil.rrirs OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE BIOLOGICAL. SCIS., NAT'L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATE-
RIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 77 (2003).
42
 For example, Emory University researcher Dr. Ray Schinazi, co-inventor of the
blockbuster drug Emtriva, claims to have gotten the idea for the new compound from
hearing a presentation by Canadian researcher Bernard Belleau at an AIDS research con-
ference in Montreal. See Leaf, supra note 23; at 254.
43 Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY 01 , SCIENCE
274-75 (1973).
44
 Con Zyrnaris, Shoulders of Giants—A Paper on the Inevitability of Open Source
Dominance 6 (Mar. 3,2003) (unpublished paper), http://www.cyber.com.au/users/conz/
shoulders.html.
228	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 47:217
Sir Isaac Newton's classic statement, "[Of I have seen further ... it is
by standing on the shoulders of giants," visually captures the concept
of cumulative learning from open science."
In the past twenty-five years, however, explicit and implicit eviscera-
don of traditional notions of academic discourse in, and academic re-
ward for, scientific endeavors has proceeded apace. The Bayh-Dole Act
mandates that universities share royalties from patented inventions with
researchers." This requirement has created a pathway for some faculty
to become millionaires, thus eroding, to some extent, the pull of the
publication incentive structure.47
 Moreover, many researchers receive
study funding from industry sources, and such sponsored research
agreements often specify a term of secrecy for results generated under
the agreement."
Encroachment on traditional sharing norms now often comes
from university intellectual property policies codified in faculty hand-
books and in the instructions of TTO personnel to vet inventive work
through the office before publishing or presenting it to avoid the loss
of potential patent rights. 49
 In addition, with increasing numbers of
45
 Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/6), in I CORRESPONDENCE
OF ISAAC NEWTON, 1661-1675, at 416 (H.W. Turnbull ed., 1959).
46 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (7) (2000).
47
 For example, under Emory University's Intellectual Property Policy, inventors re-
ceive 100% of net royalties up to $25,000, 33% of net royalties up to $4 million, and 25%
of net royalties over $4 million. Consequently, Emory's $540 million Emtriv-a sale made the
three faculty inventors millionaires. See EMORY UNIV. OFFICE, OF TECH. TRANSFER, EMORY
UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL. PROPERTY POLICY 6 (2002), available at http://www.ottemory.
edu/share/ policies/ in tellectual_property.pdf.
48 See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of
Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT. SC1. 90, 93 (2001) ("Half of the firms in our indus-
try survey noted that they include delay of publication clauses in at least 90% of their uni-
versity contracts. The average delay is nearly four months, and some firms require as much
as a year's delay.") (citation omitted).
49 See GARY RtioAnEs & SHEILA SLAUGHTER, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW
ECONOMY 115-16 (2004). The authors quote an assistant biology professor describing the
problem:
If you think you have something commercially relevant, you are required to
file a disclosure to the university before you publish it So they are essentially
sort of censoring what's being published ... the university ... is in business
too ... so it's annoying in one respect because being in academics, you need
to have all this freedom, but if you actually read the university faculty hand-
book ... anything that you think is commercially relevant has to be filed first
and then they have up to six months to decide the fate of what you are work-
ing on ... and that includes presentations at meetings. So, I don't know. The
lines between industry and universities are sort of merging.
Id. (omissions in original); see also infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
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academic researchers creating start-up companies to license and com-
mercialize the faculty member's patented inventions, there has been a
steady blurring of the lines between academic and industry research
and their concomitant rewards. Universities have had to create conflict-
of-interest policies to address these new revenue-generating incentive
sources that can detract from faculty members fulfilling their tradi-
tional teaching, training, and disseminating duties in the academy. And
all of these changes are developing in the name of the common good •
and the public interest, under the new regime of academic capitalism
that "proposes that the market rules, and that its operation serves the
interests of higher education and the larger society." 50
B. Same End, New Means
The new academic capitalism has created philosophical and prac-
tical quandaries for researchers. The philosophical conundrum arises
fr6m the tension between the lofty goals of academe and the lure of
materialism. As Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University,
notes, "Scholars, especially in the traditional disciplines, have deliber-
ately chosen academic life in preference to the ways of commerce, in
part because they look upon the search for truth and knowledge as a
worthier calling than the quest for material wealth." 51
Nevertheless, academe is now enhancing the common good
through the increased transfer of technology from its hallowed halls to
the marketplace via industry collaborations facilitated by changes in
patent policy.52
 Supporters of this new "means" to the historical "end"
of benefiting the common good cite the numerous research parks, col-
laborations, patents, start-up companies, and consumer products made
possible by the new academic capitalism.55
 For example, the website of
50
 Gary Rhoades, Capitalism, Academic Style, and Shared Governance, Acarintr., May-June
2005, at 39, available at littp://www.aatip.org/publications/Academe/2005/05mj/051Mrhort .
htm.
51
 DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 18 (2003).
RHOADES & SLAUGHTER, supra note 49, at 115-16 (discussing the pattern evident in
many university intellectual property policies of the conflict between the values of the
competing knowledge regimes of public good and academic capitalism).
55 See, e.g., Patent Law Reform Hearings, suptn note 3, at 3-4 (statement of Carl Cul-
brandsen, Managing Director, WARF) (summarizing the results of successful university
patents); 150 CONG. REC. S2559 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2004) (statements of Sens. Hatch arid
Leahy) (noting the benefits of collaborations between university and industry); ASS'N OF
UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 13, at 4-11 (describing successful products resulting
from technology transfer).
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the Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM") contains
a list of "product stories" describing successful university-generated
products and programs that is more than twenty-five pages long. 54 De-
tractors, however, note that several of these blockbuster innovations did
not require patent protection for dissemination, that fundamental dis-
coveries would have been widely used without patents, and that patents
in fact exact a toll on the use of the technology. 55 Regardless, the im-
pact of the widespread introduction of patenting and technology trans-
fer at U.S. universities has been substantial, creating many benefits but
also many controversial costs.
II. THE IMPACT OF PATENT LAW AND POLICY
Congress has many levers at its disposal to shape public policy,
and patent law is one of them. 55
 The choice of patent law as the policy
tool to address the dearth of industry interest in university-generated
research is explicitly affirmed in the text of the Bayh-Dole Act: "It is
the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development."57
 Results of this choice are visible in AUTM
Licensing Survey statistics detailing the continuing increases in inven-
tions disclosed, patents obtained, licenses executed, start-ups created,
and products commercialized.58
 Less visible, but no less important,
are the effects on the culture and norms of academic research in uni-
versities engaging in the technology transfer enterprise.
A. Benefits to Technology Transfer
On several occasions Congress has revised the patent statute to
better aid the public good, but very few amendments have had as
significant and widespread an impact as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. 59
54 See Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers, supra note 5.
55 See, e.g., Stix, supra note 24, at 37 (describing patents on upstream technologies as
"tollbooths" impeding further development).
56
 See From the Bench to the Bedside, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Sherrod Brown,
Member H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce) ("Policy tools like patents, the Bayh-Dole
Act, the Stevenson-Wydler Act, and incentives for commercialization, are important links
in the bench to bedside chain.").
57
 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
58
 SeeASS'N or UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 13, at 15-28.
59 See Pub. L. No. 96-517,94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 200-211,
301-307). Other major revisions of the patent statute include the 1836 Patent Act, which
instituted an examination system into the U.S. patent regime, replacing the flawed regis-
tration syitem of the 1793 Act. Also, the 1952 Patent Act contained the first statutory
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Although not solely responsible for the technology transfer boom of
the past several years, the impact of the Act has been profound. Bayh-
Dole, and later legislation to benefit and promote collaborative re-
search initiatives between university and industrial sector entities, are
clear examples of congressional efforts to promote the commerciali-
zation of university-generated technology. 60
1. Bridging the Gap: Bayh-Dole
The year 1980 ushered in the era of technology transfer-related
academic capitalism for U.S. universities with two landmark events, one
legislative, the Bayh-Dole Act,61 and one judicial, the U.S. Supreme
Court's Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision. 62 Two years later, Congress
gave technology transfer an additional, albeit perhaps inadvertent,
boost with the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit.63 These three events coincided with significant technological dis-
coveries in biotechnology and computer science that combined to lead
to a dramatic increase in patenting, licensing, and entrepreneurial ac-
tivities on U.S. university campuses. 64
When Congress passed the Bayh-Dole amendments to the Patent
Act in 1980, it gave universities presumptive title to inventions pro-
duced with federal funds, as long as they complied with specific re-
quirements.° By allowing patent title to vest initially in universities, the
Bayh-Dole Act paved the way for more interaction between universities
and companies, which could now obtain exclusive licenses to such pat-
codification of the non-obviousness requirement, designed to eliminate the vague and
subjective "invention" requirement and clarify patentability standards. See Patent Act of
1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (current version in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.): Pat-
ent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (current version in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
60 See From the Bench to the Bedside, supra note 12, at 55 (statement of Dr. Andrew Neigh-
bour, Vice Chancellor for Research, UCLA) ("Passage of Bayh-Dole conferred not only the
right to take title to inventions arising from government-funded research, but also an obliga-
tion to commercialize these inventions diligently for the benefit of the public.").
61 See Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 200-211,
301-307).
62 See 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (permitting a patent on genetically engineered bacte-
ria).
6° See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49).
61 See Wesley M. Cohen, Patents and Appropriation: Concerns and Evidence, 30 J. nCH.
TRANSFER 57, 59 (2005) (including the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act and the 1988 Process Patent
Amendments Act as contributors to the pro-patent era).
65 See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
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ents and commercialize academic research that previously might have
lain dormant and unused. 66
In a prepared statement before a congressional subcommittee, Dr.
Phyllis Gardner, an associate professor of medicine at Stanford Univer-
sity, succinctly outlined the pre-Bayh-Dole problem:
Prior to Bayh-Dole, federal agencies would rarely relinquish
ownership of federally funded inventions to the academic and
private institutions, even when private sector scientists and
engineers actually contributed to the inventions. Valuable
technology was left languishing on the shelves of research in-
stitutions. For example, in the 1960s, the U.S. government as-
serted that it owned rights to 5-fluorouracil (an important
anti-cancer drug) even though it had provided merely a frac-
tion of the funding that went into discovery. As a result, mar-
ket entry of this critical product was unnecessarily delayed
and industry distanced itself from federally funded university
research.°
The impetus for Bayh-Dole was the belief that a wealth of basic,
useful research developed in U.S. universities was languishing in those
ivory towers. A frequently cited statistic in hearings on the Act was that
as of 1976, less than 5% of the 28,000 government-owned patents were
licensed. 68
 This figure was attributed to private industry's reluctance to
invest in commercializing federally funded research because they could
not obtain exclusive rights to it. 69
 Such reluctance created a "death val-
ley" between publicly funded research and its commercialization by the
private sector. The Bayh-Dole Act provided a "bridge" over this valley by
allowing universities to take title to inventions developed with federal
funds and to grant exclusive licenses to entities willing to commercial-
66
 Useful summaries of the history of the Bayh-Dole Act and the varying forces leading
up to its enactment can be found in MOWERY ET AL, supra note 24, at 9-34 and Eisenberg,
supra note 24, at 1671-95.
67
 From the Bench to the Bedside, supra note 12, at 50 (statement of Dr. Phyllis Gardner,
representing the Biotechnology Industry Organization).
se MOWERY ET A[.., supra note 24, at 90.
66
 Although the funding agency could make the decision to allow licensing, such deci-
sions were rare and were made on a case-by-case basis, resulting in significant uncertainty
regarding the likelihood of a favorable result. It was well understood, of course, that com-
mercialization was beyond the mission, resources, and expertise of university researchers
and should be handled by the private sector. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 24, at 88-91.
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ize such technology." The resulting collaboration between industry,
government, and academic labs has led to shorter delays between the
invention of a new technology and its sale in the marketplace. 71
Goals for Bayh-Dole were largely unexceptional. They included
expediting the transfer of publicly supported research and develop-
ment ("R&D") results to the marketplace by promoting collaborations
between universities and industry, increasing small business participa-
tion in federal R&D efibrts, and creating new jobs and profits for re-
gional economies through the commercialization of inventions made
in the United States." The Act brought to universities the lure of new
money: a potential influx of new capital from licensing revenue derived
from transferred technology. But in order to capitalize on the oppor-
tunity, universities had to comply, with the myriad rules mandated by
Bayh-Dole, such as seeking patents on inventions as well as licensees to
commercialize the inventions." With increasing frequency, universities
began establishing TTOs to perform these functions. In 1980, twenty-
five institutions of higher learning were involved in technology transfer;
by 1990, that number had climbed to 200. 74 Similarly, the number of
patents issuing to U.S. universities "more than doubled between 1979
and 1984, more than doubled again between 1984 and 1989, and more
than doubled again over the 1990s."" Research by Rogers, Ying, and
Hartman suggested a likely impetus for the rapid and widespread adop-
tion of the TTO model by many universities across the country:
The diffusion of technology transfer offices may have been
influenced by the so-called "big winner" technologies that
have occurred at some universities. Examples are the $160
million that Michigan State University has earned over the life
of two cancer-related patents, the $37 million that the Univer-
sity of Florida has earned froth the sports drink Gatorade, the
$27 million that Iowa State University has been paid for the
fax algorithm, and the $143 million earned by Stanford Uni-
" See Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96480, 94
Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3714) (addressing technology trans-
fer in government laboratories).
71 Johnson, supra note 10, at 166.
72 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
73 See COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL. RELATIONS, THE HAYH-DOLE ACT: A Guam 'ID THE
LAW AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 4-6 (1999), available at http://www.cogr.edu/docs/
Bayh_Dole.pdf.
"Nelson, supra note 26, at 14.
75 Id. at 13.
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versity for the recombinant DNA gene-splicing patent. A "big
winner" can dominate the total license income at a research
university; for example, $18 million of Michigan State Univer-
sity's $18.3 [million] license income in FY 1997 came from the
two cancer-related drugs."
But very few universities that have set up TTOs have seen these
types of blockbuster successes. In 2000, about half of the total licens-
ing income generated by all universities was earned by the top five
grossing institutions." Creating a patenting culture in a university re-
quires a substantial, long-term investment of resources with no guar-
antee of success. On average, it takes from five to ten years before a
"To breaks even, and poor management of the office can result in
researchers having negative experiences with the technology transfer
process, creating ill will that hinders progress for years to come."
Although the impact of Bayh-Dole in the technology transfer revo-
lution has been profound, there also have been other changes in pat-
ent law and policy that have played a significant role in creating the
dual-edged technology transfer sword that is both praised and reviled
today." The same year that Congress put technology transfer on the
university map with the Bayh-Dole Act, the U.S. Supreme Court gave it
a further boost with its decision in Clzakrabarty.8° "[A]nything under the
sun that is made by man" is eligible for patent protection, according to
76 Everett M. Rogers et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Technology Transfer Offices at U.S.
Research Universities, 12 AUTM J. 47, 55 (2000), available at Imp://www.autmatet/pubs/
journa1/00/assessing.pdf (citations omitted).
77
 ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2000 SURVEY SUM-
MARY 13 (Lori Pressman ed., 2001), available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/Surveys/
3_FY2000summary public.pdf.
78 See Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, To Patent or Not: Faculty Decisions and Insti-
tutional Success at Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99, 112 (2001) ("IF)aculty de-
cide to patent because of their beliefs about the positive personal and professional out-
comes of establishing IP protection.... LT1he decision to disclose a new finding ... de-
pends upon conceptions of the patent benefits, framed by the costs of interacting with
licensing professionals and technology transfer offices.").
79 See, e.g., BOK, supra note 51, at 11-12 (citing government subsidies and tax credits as
contributing to the growth of technology transfer); Nelson, supra note 26, at 14; Eyal Press &
Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 40-41 (describing
university-industry collaboration as a response to shrinking federal research funds); Brett M.
Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A View
From the Demand Side 3-5 (Feb. 2005) (working paper on file with author) (listing some of
the many economic pressures facing universities that have lead to an increase in technology
transfer).
so See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
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the Supreme Courts' The Court lifted the phrase from the legislative
history of the Patent Act of 1952 as evidence of the broad terrain Con-
gress intended the patent laws to cover. 82 The phrase provided the basis
for the Court's path-breaking conclusion in Chakrabarty, that living or-
ganisms comprised patent eligible subject matter. 83 By expanding the
scope of patent-eligible subject matter to comprise living organisms,
including the genetically engineered bacteria at issue in the case, Chak-
rabarty jump-started the fledgling biotechnology industry and further
fueled National Institutes of Health funding of university research in
the life sciences.
The combined effects of the Chakrabarty decision and the Bayh-
Dole Act on the increase in technology transfer-related patenting have
been significant. As two commentators note in a recent article, "[Mt
roughly the same time universities were permitted to claim intellectual
property rights to the fruits of federally-funded research as a matter of
course, the universe of potentially patentable research results expanded
and the potential value of intellectual property increased."84 For exam-
ple, the relaxation of patent subject-matter standards meant that uni-
versities, often engaged in upstream research, could patent discoveries
in the early stages of development that, prior to the Chakrabarty deci-
sion, likely would not have been eligible for patent protection.
Not long after the Supreme Court widened the scope of patent-
eligible subject matter in Chakrabarty, Congress passed the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 and created the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.85 This new court, with jurisdiction over appeals
"I Id. at 309 ("Congress intended statutory subject matter to include 'anything under
the sun that is made by man.'") (quoting S. Rio'. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); 14.R. Rm.. No.
82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
"2 See id.
"3 Id. A much earlier decision, Parke•Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., in subsequent
combination with Chakrabarty, set the stage for the patenting of genes, DNA, and other
naturally occurring biological material isolated from, and in a purified state relative to, its
natural condition. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496, 498-99 (2d Cir.
1912). Although abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and products of nature are still
nominally excluded from patent eligibility, the allowance of patents covering isolated
genes and purified DNA narrows the scope of "natural phenomena" that is in the public
domain and not eligible for patent protection. For a more in-depth discussion of patent
eligibility standards in the United States, see generally Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask
Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003).
84 Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Values
and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 187, 196
(2002).
R5
 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49).
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from all patent cases in the federal district courts, 88 was formed to
eliminate the rampant forum-shopping in patent cases due to the pres-
ence of pro- and anti-patent regional circuit courts. This move had the
ultimate effect of increasing patenting levels because the Federal Cir-
cuit's largely pro-patent decisions increased the certainty of patentabil-
ity, making virtually all patents more valuable. 87
 In turn, this boosted
university-industry technology transfer because the rights universities
could award under the Bayh-Dole Act also became more valuable.
But Congress did not stop there. Additional legislative efforts,
culminating most recently in legislation to facilitate the patenting of
the results of collaborative work, evince a continued desire to benefit
university-industry partnerships through patent policy initiatives 88
2. Facilitating Collaboration: The CREATE Act of 2004
In 2004, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to university-industry
technology transfer with the passage of the Collaborative Research and
Technology Enhancement Act (the "CREATE Act"), a provision nar-
rowly tailored to remove a specific impediment to the patenting of col-
laborative research results 89 The CREATE Act overturned the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit's 1995 OddzOn v. just Toys decision and
extended the non-obviousness safe harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) to in-
clude prior inventions of researchers from different organizations oper-
ating pursuant to a joint research agreement. 9°
116 This is a bit of an overstatement_ The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals of
cases in which the plaintiff's complaint contained a claim **arising under" the Patent Act.
See Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002).
87 See Fed. Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and
Patent Law and Policy, Executive Summary, 19 BERKELEY nut. L.J. 861, 865 (2004) ("The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the sole court for most patent law appeals, has
brought stability and increased predictability to various elements of patent law.").
" See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-453, 118 Stat. 3596 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103); infra notes
89-94 and accompanying text.
" See CREATE Act 012004, 118 Stat. 3596.
"As amended by the CREATE Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) now provides:
(c) (1) Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior
art only under one or more of subsections (e), (0, and (g) of section 102 of
this title [35 USCS § 1021, shall not preclude patentability under this section
where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the
claimed invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obli-
gation of assignment to the same person.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, subject matter developed by another
person and a claimed invention shall be deemed to have been owned by the
same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person if-
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Prior to the passage of the CREATE Act, the joint collaboration of
coworkers for the same employer could not be used as prior art for ob-
viousness against later work, but that protection did not extend to the
collaborations of coworkers from different organizations, such as those
in university-industry joint research agreements. The CREATE Act elim-
inated the "same/different" organization distinction by disqualifying
from the state of the art for determining obviousness information that
is the work of researchers from different research organizations if there
had been a pre-existing agreement for research collaboration 91
In his remarks introducing the CREATE Act, Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah) explicitly related the new legislation to the goals of
Bayh-Dole:
This bill makes a narrow but important change in our patent
laws to ensure that the American public will benefit from the
results of collaborative research efforts that combine the eru-
dition of great public universities with the entrepreneurial
savvy of private enterprises.. .. [W]e must encourage—not
discourage—public institutions and private entrepreneurs to
combine their respective talents in joint research efforts. In-
deed Congress committed itself to this principle when it passed
the Bayh-Dole Amendments to the Patent Act. The CREATE
Act will simply conform the present language of the Patent
Act to the intent that has always animated it. 92
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) also praised the Bayh-Dole Act in intro-
ducing the CREATE Act:
When Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the law en-
couraged private entities and not-for-profits such as universi-
(A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties to a jotht
research agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed in-
vention was made;
(B) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken
within the scope of the joint research agreement; and
(C) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is
amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term "joint research agreement"
means a written contract, grant, or cooperative agreement entered into by
two or more persons or entities for the performance of experimental, devel-
opmental, or research work in the field of the claimed invention.
35 U.S.C.A. § 103(c) (West 2001 & Stipp. 2005).
91 See id.
" 150 CONG. REC. 32558-59 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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ties to form collaborative partnerships in order to spur inno-
vation. Prior to the enactment of this law, universities were is-
sued fewer than 250 patents each year. That this number has
in recent years surpassed two thousand is owed in large meas-
ure to the Bayh-Dole Act. The innovation this law encouraged
has contributed billions of dollars annually to the United
States economy and has produced hundreds of thousands of
jobs.93
The CREATE Act was broadly supported by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (the "USPTO"), research universities, and the bio-
tech industry, and met with little resistance as it moved through the
House and Senate. In fact, one congressman described the CREATE
Act as "a rare legislative achievement: pit is a truly noncontroversial
patent bill."94
 Although the CREATE Act itself may be uncontroversial,
the unintended side effects of Congress's earlier decision to use patent
policy to facilitate university-industry technology transfer via the Bayh-
Dole Act are cause for concern in the academy and beyond.
B. Costs to Academe
The use of patent law as a tool to promote university-industry
technology transfer via the Bayh-Dole Act is justifiable as a matter of
policy, and its effectiveness has been borne out over time. Patents
provide incentives for the disclosure, development, and commerciali-
zation of new discoveries. 95
 Patents do this by providing patentees with
the right to exclude others from practicing the invention for a term of
93 150 CONG. Ric. 52559 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
" 150 CONG. REC. 11945 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2004) (statement of Rep. Berman).
95
 Providing an incentive to disclose an invention is a well-established function of pat-
ent law. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. Rix. 1017, 1029-30 (1989) ("Secrecy makes it difficult for
inventors to sell or license their inventions to others because it is difficult to persuade
someone to pay for an idea without disclosing it, yet once the invention is disclosed, the
inventor has nothing left to sell. The patent system solves this problem by permitting in-
ventors to disclose their patented inventions to potential users without losing their exclu-
sive rights."); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 277-78 (1977) (comparing the incentive that patents provide for disclosure to the
incentive for secrecy in trade secrets law). The patent bargain requires inventors to forgo
trade secret protection and make the invention known to the world through the patent
document. Unfortunately, this disclosure generally does not take place until the patent
application describing the invention is published, which normally is eighteen months after
the filing date. Moreover, this particular incentive is not needed for the university re-
searcher, since open science and discourse norms encourage early disclosure through
publications and presentations.
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years,96 in exchange for adequately disclosing how to make and use
the invention to the public. This right to exclude is valuable because
it provides the basis for a legal monopoly that allows the inventor to
set the price for access to the invention. Patent law, however, brought
with it a whole regime of rules and regulations developed without the
norms or needs of academic researchers in mind. The result has been
a steady deterioration in the quality and quantity of scientific dis-
course, at least in some disciplines, as well as negative effects on the .
focus of academic research and the communal environment in which
it takes place.
1. Discourse: "Mum's the Word"
According to one industry newsletter, "The first impulse for uni-
versity researchers is to publish and present their results, which it
should be."97 This impulse has practical and normative origins as the
road to tenure at most institutions of higher education is paved with
publications." "Publish or perish" is the oft-heard mantra, and issued
patents and start-up companies, lucrative or not, may be considered
poor substitutes for scholarly publications by tenure committees." The
nurturing of a publication mentality begins even before matriculation,
9'6
	 current term is twenty years froth the date of filing the first non-provisional ap-
plication. See 35 U.S.C. ,E) 154 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
97 See Maclanahan, supra note 7, at 6.
98 See, e.g., David B. Rivers, When Tenure Standards Change, INSIDE HIGHER El), May 20,
2005, http://www.insidehighered.com/workplace/2005/05/20/rivers (describing the im-
pact of the adoption of a requirement for three published articles in order to be considered
for tenure); Lisa Whitten & Linda Anderson, Getting Beyond the Academic Gatekeepers: The Ten-
ure Process, Am. PSYCHO[.. ASSN DE GRADUATE STUDENTS, at 1 2, http://wwwapa.org/apags/
profdev/abttenure.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006) ("In general, a career as a 'tenure-track'
faculty member in higher education is made up of four components: teaching, service to the
institution, service to the community, and professional/scholarly development, which in-
cludes publishing, research and grants.").
99 See Itstomws & SIAUGHTER, supra note 49, at 114. According to Rhoades and Slaugh-
ter:
About 60 percent of the faculty we interviewed held patents. Almost all valued
publishing research papers more highly than patenting. A few thought pat-
ents had some merit, but they were the exception. As a professor of chemical
engineering explained: "A patent is hard to get, okay, but a patent doesn't
need to be a scientific document.... You can patent things that are just sci-
entifically terrible.... I think the thing that is valued the most is a high-
quality scientific publication."
Id. But see Erich E. Kunhardt, Op-Ed., Necessity as the Mother of Tenure?, N.Y. Timrs, Dec. 14,
2004, at A33 (`°fhe quickest way to change this mind-set will be to get administrations and
faculties to accept successful inventing as a step toward tenure.").
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as evidenced by the following advice the authors of the guide The PhD.
Process offer to budding graduate students:
[I]n order to increase your chances of future employment in
this publish-or-perish business, you have to build and main-
tain an image of productivity—publishing your work .should
be a top priority that starts in graduate school and continues
throughout your career. A publication tells the world that
your work has been judged by outside reviewers and found
deserving; your publication record is the official declaration
of your "worth" and effectiveness, and a good/consistent publi-
cation record is singularly the most important asset a scientist can
have.m
Despite the pervasive indoctrination of publishing norms among aca-
demic scientists, 10' more and more researchers in the United States
appear to be delaying or forgoing acting on this impulse. A recent
article in Fortune magazine notes that the U.S. contribution to global
knowledge, as measured by published articles in top journals around
the world, is "stagnating." 1°2 Although there may be other contribut-
ing factors, patents are one of the likely culprits for this disturbing
result. 103
A recent analysis of the presentation, publication, and patenting
patterns of university scientists in 1980 and 1990 revealed a troubling
trend: an increase in scientists withholding presentation of their data
in order to seek patents.m The analysis considered the difference in
the "publication gap," the delay between a scientist's presentation of
100 DALE F. BLOOM KT Al,., THE PH.D. PROCESS: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO GRADUATE
SCHOOL IN THE SCIENCES 74-75 (1998).
101 See generally IPR Helpdesk, Grace Period and Invention Law in Europe and Selected States,
[PR Helpdesk, littp://www.ipr-helpdesk.org/documentos/docsPublicacion/pdf xml/8_
GracePeriodinventionLaw[0000004514 00].pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (explaining the
difficulties for university inventors caused by the lack of a grace period in Europe because
publications are "decisive" for an academic researcher's career and reputation).
102 See Leaf, supra note 23, at 262 ("While the number of journal articles produced by
American researchers has risen slightly since 1988, the rest of the world has raced ahead
")
105 See Grushcow, supra note 16, at 67-68 ("[S]cientists seeking to patent their inven-
tions face a conflict between the incentives created by patent law to keep their data secret
until they are substantially finished and the norms of the scientific community, which dic-
tate that data should be shared at an early stage.") (citation omitted).
104 Id. at 73-74. Jeremy M. Grushcow further notes that even non-patent-seeking aca-
demics are delaying publication, though to a lesser degree, perhaps as a response to in-
creased secrecy by patent-seekers, or simply the increasing competitiveness of the aca-
demic research environment after Bayh-Dole. Id. at 75-78.
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data at a scientific conference and the formal publication of that data
in a peer-reviewed journal, as well as the increase in meeting abstracts
associated with patents. Whereas in 1980, 4.5% of the meeting ab-
stracts examined were associated with a patent, by 1990, the corre-
sponding number was 19.2%. 106
 Moreover, 88% of patents associated
with meeting abstracts had patent application filing priority dates be-
fore the conference presentation, indicating that the researchers de-
layed presenting data until after a patent application had been filed.
The author of the study observed that:
Consistent with the incentive to withhold data when seeking
patents, the lag between abstract presentation at the meeting
and the formal publication in a peer-reviewed journal was
shorter for university and NIH scientists 1 °6
 who sought patents
than for their peers who did not seek patents. University sci-
entists who sought patents presented meeting abstracts only
on work that was complete, on average publishing formally in
the same year as the meeting abstract, whereas university sci-
entists who were not seeking patents published on average
1.21 years after their data were presented as a meeting ab-
stract. 107
The author concluded from the data that "scientists who seek patents
are more secretive, withholding publication or presentation of their
data so as not to jeopardize patentability." 1 °8
 What is it about patents
that would cause such a shift in behavior? Quite simply, the need to
comply with the patent novelty rules prompts researchers to delay pub-
licizing their efforts.
a. The Need to Be New: Patent Novelty Rules
In the U.S. system, patents are awarded for new and useful "ma-
chines, processes, manufactures, and compositions of matter." 109 But
111° Id. at 73.
106
 The Stevenson-Wydler Act applied the Bayh-Dole Act provisions to researchers in
government labs, such as the NIH. Sea Stevenson-Wydler Act, Pub. L. N. 102-45, 106 Stat.
20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3710). Consequently, such researchers also have increased in-
centives to patent and commercialize their work.
107
 Grushcow, supra note 16, at 74 (internal citation omitted). Ninety percent of meet-
ing abstracts, however, were followed up with a formal publication. Id. at 75. This indicates
that even though university researchers may withhold early data, they still seek the "kudos"
ultimately associated with publication, Id.
1°11
 Id. at 82.
109 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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it is not enough for an invention to fit in one of these categories, it
must also be novel and non-obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the invention pertains. 1111
Both the novelty and non-obviousness requirements mandate a
comparison of the invention with prior art identified by 35 U.S.C.
§ 102) 11
 Prior art is defined as "knowledge that is available, including
what would be obvious from it, at a given time, to a person of ordinary
skill in an art," as long as that information is drawn from the sources
of information identified in § 102(a)—(g). 112
 Under these provisions,
patent-defeating prior art can include printed publications from any-
where in the world, public knowledge or use of the invention before
the applicant's date of invention, or public use or sale, even by the
inventor, more than one year before the applicant's filing date." Sec-
11 ° See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. HI 2003) (novelty); 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2001
& Supp. 2005) (non-obviousness). Section 102 contains the novelty requirement and pro-
vides that:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the in-
vention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States
35 U.S.C. § 102. The non-obviousness requirement is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103, which
provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A patent may riot be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manlier in
which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C.A. § 103.
in 35 U.S.C. § 102.
112
 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It
• is worth noting that an applicant need not be aware of prior art for the information to be
used against her patent application. Knowledge of all of the relevant art is presumed on
the part of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill. See In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038
(Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Howarth, 654 F.2c1 103, 106 (C.C.PA. 1981) ("Section 102 has as one
objective that only the first inventor obtain a patent .... Foreign 'patents' and foreign
'printed publications' preclude the grant of a patent whether or not the information is
commonly known. Under § 102 a conclusive presumption of knowledge of such prior art
is, in effect, a statutorily required fiction.").
its See Carlson, 983 F.2d at 1038; Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d at 1453; Howarth, 654 F.2d at
106.
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tion 102 identifies the knowledge against which patentability is as-
sessed and details the bases upon which an applicant can be denied a
patent because of the lack of novelty of the invention itself or the loss
of the inventor's right to the invention. 114 Thus, an inventor can lose
the right to obtain a potentially lucrative patent on an invention by
publicly disclosing her invention, such as through presentation or
publication, before filing a patent application.
As between an inventor seeking a patent and the preservation of
the public domain, the courts have overwhelmingly interpreted the
§ 102 prior art rules in favor of the public domain. This is consistent
with an understanding that "the novelty and non-obviousness require-
ments express a congressional determination that the purposes behind
the [Intellectual Property] Clause [of the U.S. Constitution] are best
served by free competition and exploitation of either that which is al-
ready available to the public or that which may be readily discerned
from publicly available material."" 6
As a result, "printed publications," which are a category of prior
art under the statute, have been interpreted to include microfilm, mi-
crofiche, Internet postings, videotapes, and, most recently, slides
affixed to poster boards, as long as they are publicly accessible." 6 That
latest expansion of the phrase was enunciated in the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's 2004 In re Klopfenstein decision." 7 For the first
time, the court held that university researchers who presented study
results at a scientific conference more than two years before filing a
patent application covering the advance were barred from patenting
the disclosed invention even though no copies of any enabling docu-
ment were distributed."" The rejection was based on the fact that
slides disclosing the later-claimed invention were displayed on posters
at the conference for two and a half days without any notice that note-
taking was prohibited." 9
114
 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Stipp. III 2003). Subsections (a), (e), (f), and (g) arc consid-
ered novelty provisions, while subsections (b), (c), and (d) are loss-of-right provisions under
which an inventor loses the right to a patent because the invention is legally deemed to lack
novelty. See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
115
 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989).
116 See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that slides ac-
companying a poster presentation are a "printed publication"); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897,
898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that the phrase printed publication "has been interpreted to
give effect to ongoing advances in the technologies of data storage, retrieval, and dissemi-
nation").
117 Klopfenaein, 380 F.3d at 1352.
118 Id.
"6 Id.
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The court's reliance on a "totality of the circumstances" approach
could have a further chilling effect on conference presentations by uni-
versity researchers seeking to disseminate early results, since its analysis
fails to provide clear guidelines on which presenters can rely to avoid
losing patent rights. This is quite unfortunate considering the impor-
tance of conference presentations to knowledge dissemination. As one
commentator explains:
Conference presentations of early data are not only consistent
with the communalist norms of scientists, they also serve an
important economic function by helping scientists avoid
wasteful effort both by sending signals to other scientists and
by receiving information from other scientists. First, early data
sharing may avoid the expenditure of duplicative effort by al-
lowing scientists working on similar projects to identify each
other. They then have the opportunity to either diversify their
efforts, collaborate ... , or abandon one of the projects. Sec-
ond, early data sharing can reduce wasted effort by allowing
other scientists to shed light on a project that is not duplica-
tive but merely misguided.... Therefore, the increased
financial reward for inventive activity increases the risk of rent
dissipation in the form of wasted expenditures both from du-
plicative races to invent and from misguided research that
continues unchecked. 12°
Unfortunately, the Klopfenstein decision may discourage this important
form of data sharing and waste avoidance.
b. The Trouble with Grace
In most countries, when an inventor discloses an invention to the
public before filing a patent application, she creates prior art that will
prevent her from later obtaining a patent on her invention. 121 In the
United States, inventors have a one-year grace period during which
they can disclose the invention to the public and still retain the right
to obtain a patent on the invention. 122 The grace period is an impor-
tant policy tool that recognizes an inventor's need to assess an inven-
120
 Grushcow, salmi note 16, at 68.
121 Specifically, this is the case in most European countries and in Japan. See infra notes
201-14 and accompanying text.
1" 35 U.S.C. 102(b) (2000).
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tion's commercial potential before making the expensive decision to
seek patent protection.
There are, however, two significant problems with the current
grace period. First, the lack of a one-year grace period in major foreign
patent systems virtually eliminates the benefit of the U.S. grace period
for inventors whose discoveries will require patent protection abroad to
fulfill their commercial potentia1. 123 Despite the fact that blockbuster
successes tend to be limited to the life sciences, 124 Tros generally take
a prophylactic approach to invention disclosures, advising virtually all
researchers to seek patent protection before making a public disclosure
that could eliminate the opportunity to obtain foreign patent rights. 125
This approach is understandable, as it is impossible to know for certain
ex ante which inventions will be hugely successful. But it is also regretta-
ble, because it unnecessarily delays the disclosure of much information
that either does not need patent protection to be commercializable or
would not be sufficiently successful to justify the costs of obtaining for-
eign patent protection. As David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven
N. Sampat, and Arvids A. Ziedonis note in a recent work:
Patent protection is strong and economically significant in
biomedical research, and the dominance of licensing reve-
nues by biomedical inventions reflects this fact. But in other
areas, such as electronics, a commercial device may require
access to dozens or hundreds of patents, and the average
value of a patent often is much lower. Patent licenses are
typically less important in these fields. . . . Indeed, in such
fields, the insistence by university administrators on exten-
sive agreements covering intellectual property may serve as a
source of friction rather than as a lubricant for research col-
laborations. It is important for university research adminis-
trators to adjust their intellectual property policies to ac-
commodate these intersectoral differences, rather than con-
123 See infra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
124 See MOWERY ET Al., .supm note 24, at 56.
125
 Such a disclosure requirement may be mandated by the university's intellectual
property policy. See, e.g., EMORY UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. TRANSFER, supra note 47, at 5
("Emory Personnel will promptly disclose the existence of any Intellectual Property (that is,
Intellectual Property to which Emory may assert ownership rights ....) "); OFFICE. OF FAC-
ULTY SUPPORT SERVS., GA. INST. OF rEECH., FACULTY HANsmoort 180-81 (2005), arrailaltle at
hap; //www.acadernic.gatech.eduiliandbook/Georgia_Institute_of Technology_Faculty
Flandbook_Oct2005.pclf ("To assure protection and potential G.)mmercialization, Georgia
Tech faculty, staff, and students are encouraged to disclose Intellectual Property to GTRC in
a timely manner prior to any disclosure outside of Georgia Institute of Technology.").
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ceptualizing all research collaborations as resembling those
common in biomedical research. 126
Likewise, patent protection, foreign or otherwise, may not be nec-
essary for the commercialization of inventions in all areas of technol-
ogy. In one recent study, licensees of patents held by universities were
asked, "How often are the technologies that you license protected by a
patent at the time you negotiate the license agreement?" 127
 Only 12%
of responding licensees answered "almost always," 13% said "often,"
48% said "sometimes," and 28% said "rarely." 128 Yet with TTOs focused
on revenue generation and unable to make clear commercialization
determinations with limited information on inventions in the early
stages of development, 129 researchers are routinely encouraged not to
present or publish research results or, at a minimum, to hold off on
doing so until a provisional patent application can be filed by the
TTO.'" This builds an inevitable delay into the otherwise early disclo-
sure of research results in written or oral form. Moreover, researchers
who intentionally or inadvertently make disclosures of their research
before filing a patent application may then be discouraged from seek-
ing, or be unable to obtain, even U.S. patent protection for their inven-
tions. 131 Although this may seem a positive result for opponents of
rampant university patenting, this is not necessarily a good result, if the
justifications for Bayh-Dole were correct.
Second, even a one-year grace period often is not long enough to
accommodate the needs of many researchers due to the realities of
academic research and TTO practices. It is not uncommon for more
126 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 24, at 190-91.
127 Jerry G. Thursby at al., Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University Licensing: A
Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59, 62 (2001).
125 See id.; see also Nelson, supra note 26, at 15-16 ("[Wie also have observed several
cases of embryonic inventions in which companies were interested in taking the work fur-
ther, even if they did not have an exclusive license.").
129 Thursby et al., supra note 127, at 61-62. The study authors also note that over 80% of
licensed university technologies are only a proof of concept or lab scale prototype. Id. at 62.
130 See, e.g., Heisler, supra note 7, at 1 (warning about losing patent rights as a result of
disclosing research results); Maclanahan, supra note 7, at 6 (same); Univ. of Va. Patent
Found., Frequently Asked Questions, 1[11 2, 4, 5, http://www.uvapforg/about/index.cfm
/fuseaction/viewpage/page_id/66?CFID=479884&CFTOKEN=62273255& (last visited
Mar. 2, 2006) (suggesting that researchers should submit potentially patentable ideas to
the University of Virginia Patent Foundation before presenting results in a paper or risk
losing patent rights).
131 This could occur if, for example, a TrO refused to assume the cost of patent pro-
tection because of the disclosure and the university researcher was unable to afford the
patent procurement costs.
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than a year to transpire before academic research progresses to the
point where its commercial potential can be assessed effectively. Uni-
versity inventions tend to be at a very early stage when they are first dis-
closed to TTO personnel, who generally have limited resources and
data for making decisions about which inventions to attempt to pat-
ent.'" This situation is complicated by the propensity of TTOs to use
provisional patent applications to save money while securing a priority
filing date for university-generated inventions.
Introduced into U.S. law in 1995, provisional applications offer
applicants a lower filing fee and an additional twelve months beyond
the grace period in which to determine whether to file a regular non-
provisional application for a patent.'" Provisional applications also pro-
tect an applicant's right to file in other countries as long as the provi-
sional application is filed before the invention is disclosed to the pub-
lic. 134
 The provisional application is not examined by the USPTO and
simply lapses after twelve months, with no further effect unless a regu-
lar non-provisional application is filed before that time. Provisional ap-
plications are attractive to TTOs precisely because of the embryonic
nature of most university inventions. Funding and staffing are perpet-
ual problems for most university TTOs, and provisional applications
provide benefits in both areas. For a university, the filing fee for a provi-
sional application is $100, while combined filing, search, and examina-
tion fees of $500 are required for non-provisional patent applica-
tions. 135
 Moreover, since the provisional application will not be exam-
ined, TTOs may choose to spend less time and money on the drafting
of the provisional application based on an understanding that in a
year's time, many will lapse because the covered technology ultimately
will not justify the cost of filing a further non-provisional application.
Although the USPTO does riot report the number of provisional
applications filed by type of entity in its statistical reports, the AUTM
132 See Thursby et al., supra note 127, at 63 ("Products and proceises based on early
stage technologies are often years away From commercialization.... [At is difficult to spec-
ify royalty income based on sales ... for very early stage technologies since the nature of
the final product is often unknown ....").
133 See 35 U.S.C. § 111(6) , 119(e) (2000) .
1M
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303.
133 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Fiscal Year 2006 Fee Schedule, 37 C.F.R.
1.16(a) (1) (2005), available at http://www.taspto.gov/web/oflices/ac/qs/ope/fee2005
oct01.1itm; see 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (1) (qualifying universities for reduced fees as small enti-
ties). The $500 filing fee includes search and examination lees, both of which are required
upon filing non-provisional applications. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Fiscal Year 2006
Fee Schedule, supra.
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now provides provisional application tiling data in its annual survey. 136
According to the survey, in fiscal year 2004, of the 8286 new U.S. utility
applications filed by U.S. universities, hospitals, and research institutes,
75% were provisional applications.'" Conversely, the USPTO reports
that provisional application filings for fiscal year 2004 only accounted
for approximately 30% of total utility application filings across all ap-
plicants.P8 This suggests that universities may indeed rely much more
heavily on provisional applications than other types of patent appli-
cants. For example, in its 'Technology Transfer Flow Diagram," the
University of Virginia Patent Foundation notes "[ii nventions and pat-
ent applications go hand-in-hand. If patentable subject matter is
identified during initial review, and there is sufficient market potential,
a Patent Foundation attorney will file a Provisional Patent Application
as an initial step to protect the invention."" 9
A provisional application, however, is still a patent application, and
it should be well-drafted if it is to provide any real long-term benefit. 14°
136 See Ass' N Or UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 1, at 16.
137 Id.
13H U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, at Hfi tbl.1 (2004), available at http://www.usplo.gov/web/offices/
com/annual/2004/060401_tablel.html.
139
 Univ. of Va. Patent Found., Technology Transfer Flow Diagram, http://wiaw.mrapf.
org/ (follow "Our Technology Transfer Flow Diagram" hyperlink; then follow "Patent
Protection" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2006); see also TECH. TRANSFER OFFICE, UNIV. Or
Coto., BuLt.wrmr —COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 1,
http: //www.cusys.edu/techtransfer/downloads/bulletins/Bulletin-Commercial%20Tech-
nology%20Licensing%20and%20Intellectual%20Freedom.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2006)
fhst step in obtaining patent protection is drafting and filing a provisional patent
application. This document, which is prepared by outside legal counsel, can range in
thoroughness from a complete patent application, to a cover sheet on a manuscript (which
is done in emergency situations).").
140
 See, e.g., Arnold B. Silverman, Proceed with Caution with U.S. Provisional Patent Applica-
tions, JOM, Feb. 2000, at 88, available at http://www.trils.org/pubs/journals/JOM/mat-
ters/matters-0002.huni . Arnold B. Silverman notes:
One problem that occurs frequently is that the provisional application, which
was filed with a somewhat sketchy disclosure and no claims, is the subject of a
later-filed complete application based upon the provisional. With the benefit
of additional technical information generated in the intervening period be-
tween the two filings or the need for the first time to claim the invention, se-
rious issues as to whether the provisional had adequate disclosure to satisfy
the statute's disclosure requirement regarding broadening or to support the
breadth of the claim can arise. This results in uncertainty as to whether the
effective date of the added increment of disclosure or claiming is the date
when the provisional application was filed or when the actual complete appli-
cation was filed.
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This is because claims in any later filed non-provisional application that
require the prior art protection of an earlier-filed provisional applica-
don must be adequately supported by the information disclosed in the
earlier application.
In a further complication for university inventors, the wisdom of
heavy reliance on provisional applications has recently come into ques-
don as a result of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's 2005
Phillips v. AWH Corp. decision."' In Phillips, a closely watched and highly
anticipated case, the court articulated the components of the claim
construction inquiry that often determines the validity and infringe-
ment issues in patent litigationg42
 The court accorded the patent
specification a high level of importance in the analysis, noting that "the
specification 'is always highly relevant to the claim construction analy-
sis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
disputed terrn."143
 This focus on the specification suggests inventors
and practitioners would do well to place more emphasis on drafting a
good disclosure that includes claims, a practice that may not be the
norm for most TTOs with numerous early-stage invention disclosures
and a limited prosecution budget.'"
One way to avoid this dilemma or minimize the risk is to File a provisional
that has a complete specification and claims directed toward all aspects of the
invention known at the time the provisional was filed. This approach, while in-
creasing the cost of the provisional filing, minimizes the risk that important as-
pects of the technology will be of uncertain value, depending upon the filing
date of the provisional, the filing date of a later-filed complete application,
and any intervening prior art or conduct that could generate a forfeiture of
patent rights. It also preserves all of the other benefits of the provisional ap-
plication.
Id. (emphasis added).
111
 See 415 F.3d 1303, 1514 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
142 Id. at 1315.
145 Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)) (emphasis added).
144 See Posting of Dennis Crouch, Including Claims in Provisional Patent Applications?, to
Patently-O: Patent Law Blog, http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/claim_drafting_tips/
index.html (Sept. 16, 2005). Even if no claims are included in the application, the follow-
ing advice from Dennis Crouch, a patent attorney and blogger, seems apt:
In the wake of Phillips v. AWH, it has become even more important to en-
sure that a patent's specification accurately describes the meaning of the as-
sociated claim terms. This task is all but impossible in the absence of any
claim terms to describe. Thus, it is important to draft at least a few model
claims with the provisional application.
Id.
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If TTOs follow the counsel from Phillips and put a greater invest-
ment into preparing and filing first applications (provisional or non-
provisional), they will probably file fewer applications,'" resulting in
fewer inventions with commercial potential being covered by patents.
This could be a blessing in disguise as it potentially would put more
information into the public domain. Alternatively, the effect could be
negative, since university-generated inventions tend to be disclosed at a
much earlier stage of development and require significant inventor as-
sistance for commercialization.'" Inventors unable to secure patent
protection may discontinue the exploration of those relevant lines of
research, a result that flies in the face of the policies underlying Bayh-
Dole and thus could be detrimental to society over the longer term.
Because so many university-generated inventions are embryonic in na-
ture, however, and their commercial potential so uncertain, TTOs may
continue to rely on provisional applications, choosing to let questions
of the value of any resulting patent be evaluated by potential investors.
This could lead to more uncertainty and lower values being assigned to
university patents that rely on the benefit of provisional application
filing dates.
2. Research Focus and Academic Community
I think that faculty members deciding not to patent would be rare indeed
here . . . . Even if you were so inclined it would be hard to ignore how fabu-
lously successful some of your peers are. You know, from the kind of cars
they park in the parking lot and your children might be interacting with
their children and say hey dad, why does Joe have all of this while we're liv-
ing in a thatched roof hut? It would just be astonishing not to notice. 147
The above quote from a faculty member at a large private research
university highlights another side effect of the patent/technology trans-
fer boom: erosion of the sense of community in academia. Bayh-Dole's
requirement that universities must share profits from subject inventions
with inventors has created millionaires among the faculty ranks at some
institutions.'" Although a strong patenting culture can be beneficial in
145
 This assumes no change in resource level.
1411 Thursby et al., supra note 127, at 62.
147 Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 78, at 112 (quoting a life scientist at an elite pri-
vate university).
'48 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (7) (B) (2000); see also Leaf, .supra note 23, at 252 (discussing the
millions of dollars reaped by Emory University professors in the sale of patent royalty rights).
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terms of attracting like-minded new faculty and socializing academy
members to engage in that pursuit, 149 it can also be detrimental, lead-
ing in some cases to rancor, turf disputes, loss of collegiality, and more,
within and between academic departments. 15° Moreover, the desire to
share in the material benefits successful patent licensing can provide
may lead some academics to shift the focus of their research into areas
more likely to generate proprietary, commercializable results.
A loss of community is also a consequence of increased secrecy
among scientists. One study in 2000 reported that 63% of geneticists
surveyed reported that data withholding harmed the quality of their
relationships with peers, 45% said it affected their satisfaction with their
careers, and 28% reported ending a research collaboration because of
it.'" Of course, patents are not the only cause of the loss of community
observable at some institutions of higher learning. Certainly the Bayh-
Dole Act's requirement that universities share profits on patented in-
ventions with inventors, along with industry sponsorship agreements
mandating secrecy in exchange for funding and consulting opportuni-
ties, are also to blame. Furthermore, the seeming lack of institutional
will on the part of university administrations to create stronger policies
cabining disclosure requirements in industry agreements only exacer-
bates the problem. 152
1A9 See Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 78, at 1 I I.
150 See Nelson, supra note 26, at 17 ("[L]arge across-department differences [in remu-
neration] clearly are a source of tension.... These tensions are real. To the extent that
those parts of the university generating the license revenues have their way, universities will
tend to divide into communities of the 'have' and a large community of the 'have not.'").
Loss of community is not just a result of university patenting, but is also attributable to
other aspects of the increase in acadentic capitalism across the United States. As one
commentator notes:
Capitalism, academic style, was once most evident in the realm of patent-
ing and technology transfer, ...	 tit now it extends to instruction ....
Academic capitalism is a cultural: system within higher education; it is an
internal, not just external, threat. It shapes the way we talk about and define
our role in the academy. University presidents increasingly see themselves as
CEOs, and ask to be paid accordingly. More faculty view themselves as small
.businesspeople
Capitalist consciousness reveals itself in the tendency of universities to
conflate productivity with generation of external monies, and in that of fac-
ulty who get grants to talk of how they "subsidize" other fields.
Rhoades, supra note 50, at 39. Although the overall loss of community is important, non-
patent-driven losses in the areas of focus and community are beyond the scope of this Article.
151
 Campbell et al., supra note 18, at 978.
152
 Wesley M. Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of Tech-
nological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH UNIVERsETIES 171, 194 (Roger G. Null ed.,
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Whether benefits associated with patenting or obtaining spon-
sored research funds are causing many researchers to shift from a focus
on basic to applied research is unclear.'" Nevertheless, it appears that
the incentives of the patent system are affecting the publication norms
and practices of some academics. Consider the following scenario:
Peter; a twenty-three year old Ph.D. student in Chemistry at Big X
University, discovers some interesting properties of a class of com-
pounds he is experimenting with and decides to publish an article
disclosing some of his early findings. Based on counsel from the Big
X University ITO, Peter waits until a provisional patent applica-
tion covering his results is on file with the USPTO before publishing
his article. Peter's research continues to proceed but not as quickly as
he had hoped, and, twelve months after the filing of the provisional
application, he still has several technical hurdles to clear; and com-
mercial applications of his work are still years away.
Forced to make a prediction of the commercial potential of Peter's
work, the TTO chooses not to file a non-provisional application at
the end of twelve months and the provisional application lapses. Pe-
ter makes more progress over the next several months but is then
counseled by his advisor to change the direction of his research
significantly. This is because the publication of the article covering
his early findings is now prior art to any future patent application
he might file on his new, related discoveries, which probably would
not be considered to be different enough from the earlier public disclo-
sure to overcome an obviousness rejection. Despite Peter's great inter-
est in the area, he follows the instruction and changes his research
focus. 154
Peter's predicament is troubling for a variety of reasons. First, Pe-
ter's delay in publishing his results until after the filing of a provisional
application is part of a growing trend of secrecy among university re-
searchers in scientific disciplines (the life sciences in particular) that
runs counter to traditional academic and scientific community norms
1998) ('The leverage academics hold may be strengthened if, during their negotiations
with firms, they could invoke strong guidelines for research disclosure. Individual universi-
ties or research universities collectively could create such guidelines and could even back
them up by monitoring the disclosure restrictions that come with industry support.").
I" See Thursby & Thursby, supra note 48, at 92 ("Much of the concern of those who
question the {Bayh-Dole's Mct's impact comes from fears that financial returns to licens-
ing would divert faculty from basic to applied research.... [W]e cannot reject the notion
that faculty research has shifted.") (emphasis added).
154
 Based on an actual event. Names and identifying features have been changed.
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of open discourse and knowledge sharing. By delaying publication of
his research until after the filing of the provisional patent application,
Peter potentially has retarded the expansion of knowledge in his area
by limiting the pool of information available for others to build upon.
Second, by failing to file a non-provisional application before the
provisional application lapsed, the Big X University TTO inadvertently
may have led Peter to believe he had protection that he really did not
have. Consequently, he may be (I) more secretive in the future regard-
ing his research results or (2) more hesitant to participate in the patent
process. 155 These are both detrimental effects but for different reasons.
Greater secrecy on the part of university researchers further stifles dis-
course and keeps more information from being built upon, and for
longer periods of time. Hesitation by university researchers to partici-
pate in the patent process, while not facially a negative result, is harm-
ful if patents are important to the commercialization of university-
generated research. This problem also could be mitigated through bet-
ter TTO education of and communication with academic inventors re-
garding the patent application timeline and the percentage of provi-
sional applications that are normally converted to non-provisionals at
that university. Such communication could help the inventor make a
more informed decision about, for example, whether to engage in
prior-art-generating presentation or publication activities on the
strength of a provisional application filing. But the information would
not change the fact that twelve months simply may be an insufficient
period of time in which to assess the commercial potential and techni-
cal difficulty of a discovery.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this scenario is Peter's advi-
sor's attitude, reflected in his recommendation that Peter change the
direction of his research to one in which patent rights might still be
obtainable. The goal of Bayh-Dole was to commercialize the results of
university research, not to change its focus. Although this experience
is anecdotal and may not be a widespread phenomena in academia,
that it happens at all is concerning and suggests a misguided lust for
patents over progress that is the antithesis of both academic inquiry
and the fundamental goals of the patent system.I 56
155 See Owen-Smith & Powell, supra note 78, at 110 ("The failure to pursue smaller
scale 'bread and butter' disclosures limits future chances for commercial success by en-
couraging faculty to bypass the TTO or avoid commercial activities altogether.").
156 See RHOADES & SLAUGHTER, supra note 49, at 109-12 (citing cases of faculty
conflicts with Ph.D. students relating to patents).
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A variety of solutions have been proposed to deal with various is-
sues associated with university-industry technology transfer, including
heightening the utility requirement so that fewer upstream inventions
(such as research tools) are eligible for patent protection, codifying an
experimental use exemption into patent law, and giving funding agen-
cies more latitude in deciding whether to take title to certain funda-
mental inventions away from universities. 157
 These are promising initia-
tives, but without a more fundamental change in the strictures of pat-
ent law, they are unlikely to affect the publication delay and
deterioration of academic norms spreading throughout academia to-
day. Perhaps a different approach, targeted to the specific problems
that contribute to the perceived need for increased secrecy in the acad-
emy, can stem the rising tide of secrecy and enable, at least in part, the
revival of communal sharing norms and discourse.
III. CAN WE TALK?: PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
[T]he patent system will influence the behavior of research scientists more
effectively if it takes into account the norms and incentives that guide be-
havior in the scientific community. 158
The one-year grace period is an aid to university researchers be-
cause it enables them to engage in scholarly discourse through presen-
tations and publications while still retaining the right to obtain a U.S.
patent. I propose that the strictures of patent law that have contributed
to the increasing strain on scholarly discourse be relaxed to allow uni-
versity researchers159
 more time in which to disclose aspects of their
early-stage research while still retaining the right to obtain a patent on
better defined, down-stream inventions. More specifically, I propose
amending the U.S. Patent Act to create an opt-in system whereby aca-
demic researchers could choose to have two years from the time they
first disclose the invention to the public to file an application with the
USPTO. This would extend the amount of time available to inventors
and TTOs to determine whether to file a patent application.
In exchange for a front-end grace period extension, researchers
availing themselves of the provision would agree to give up the nor-
157
 See, e.g., Lopez-Beverage, supra note 26, at 92; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 56.
158 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Re-
search, 97 YALE U. 177, 231 {1987).
159
 For simplicity of implementation, similar rules could be made available for other
small entities as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.9. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.9 {2005).
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mal eighteen-month patent application pre-publication period. 160 In
essence, inventors would agree to the publication of their applica-
tions, provisional or non-provisional, immediately after the filing date.
Such an amendment should improve scholarly discourse and benefit
the public good by lowering the risk to researchers of complying with
academic norms of early disclosure of results. It should also be a boon
to technology transfer by enabling TTOs to better allocate patent-
obtaining resources to inventions with the most commercial potential.
Such a provision might be even more palatable to third parties if
accompanied by an experimental use exemption, allowing for ex-
perimentation on and perhaps with the disclosed invention without
fear of infringement liability. 161
 Such an exemption could be useful
because under the extended grace period, even with immediate pub-
lication, third parties may have longer to wait before they know
whether the inventor will seek patent protection and for what aspects
of the disclosed information protection will be sought.
In addition, to have any impact on the deterioration of disclosure
norms in the life sciences, the United States must use its considerable
influence, with at a minimum its trilateral harmonization partners the
European Union and Japan, to encourage the adoption of a one-year
prior art grace period abroad. 162 This would allow university inventors
seeking to secure U.S. and foreign patent protection to engage in
academic discourse during the extant one year grace period that they
currently must forgo.
16° See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
161 See, e.g., Brief for Bar Ass'n of D.C.—Patent, Trademark, & Copyright Section as
Amid Curae Supporting Neither Party, at it Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd.,
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 435891 (arguing that it is "an absolute
necessity to maintain some experimental use exemption for the operation of the patent
system"); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption From United States
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development,
56 BAYLOR. L. REV. 917, 972 (2004) (proposing legislative codification of an experimental
use exemption); Katherine]. Strandburg, What Does the Public. Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 121-22 (distinguishing two kinds of experimental use
exemptions, one for experimenting on a patented invention, and one for experimenting
with a patented invention).
162
 In 1983, the three major patent-granting offices in the world, the USPTO, the
European Patent Office, and the Japanese Patent Office began formally cooperating with
each other by, among other things, sharing information regarding procedures in each
office, holding annual trilateral conferences, and gathering and comparing statistical re-
ports. The Trilateral website is the repository for reports and news items relating to the
cooperation and its current projects. See Website of the Trilateral Co-operation, Imp://
www.trilateral.net
 (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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A. Extending Grace and Prompt Publication
As noted above, the period of time during which an invention
can be exposed to the public without impacting its novelty for patent-
ability purposes is generally known as a grace period. 163 Inventors
must file patent applications in the USPTO within one year of disclos-
ing the invention to the public or forfeit the right to obtain a patent
on that invention. 164
 Although disclosures of early-stage research may
not be "enabling" as required for rejections under § 102(b), even a
non-enabling reference can be used in a rejection for obviousness
under § 103 of the Patent Act. 165
 Moreover, the enablement require-
ment applies to patent daims. 166
 Generally, a researcher will not know
the scope of final patent claims at the time a public disclosure is made
even if a provisional application is filed prior to the disclosure, be-
cause (1) provisional applications are not required to contain claims
and (2) claims invariably are amended during the prosecution of the
later-filed non-provisional patent application. Thus, the status of the
disclosure, as enabling or not, cannot be known with certainty at the
time the disclosure is being made.
Under my proposal, the current one-year prior art grace period
and the eighteen-month publication system would remain intact. The
patent laws would be amended, however, to create an optional two-year
grace period for university researchers needing the additional prior art
protection because of public disclosures made through presentation or
publication activities. In exchange for the front-end extension of grace,
researchers choosing to avail themselves of the provision would agree
to immediate publication of their patent application upon filing, in-
stead of relying on the eighteen-month blanket of secrecy provided to
other applications.' 67
 This two-part system would have the effect of
enabling academic researchers to engage in the discourse so necessary
to norms of open science while still giving third parties an early indica-
tion, through immediate publication, of whether patent protection
would be sought for information disclosed in public forums. By nar-
rowly tailoring these proposed changes for exclusive use by academic
165 See supra notes 121-46 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
165 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
166
 See U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
167 See id. § 122. Immediate publication should not be a burden to academic research-
ers because the only inventors taking advantage of the extended grace period would be
those who had previously disclosed the invention to the public.
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researchers, the impact of increased uncertainty on third parties should
be minimized.
Creating special rights for a certain category of inventors, however,
generates other costs associated with discriminating between types of
inventors, including incentives for inefficient behavior and the added
statutory complexity of the need to develop effective definitions for
determining who qualifies as an academic researcher. Consequently, an
alternative course might be to adopt an opt-in provision that would be
available to all inventors. While a narrowly drawn provision is prefer-
able, such a broad provision could end up having the same positive ef-
fects as a narrowly tailored provision since the inventors most likely to
make use of the provision would be academic researchers. Industry in-
ventors by and large still value secrecy in obtaining a competitive edge
and could be expected to be less likely to concede immediate publica-
tion of their patent applications. Individual inventors also tend to rely
more on secrecy than do academic researchers. In fact, the provision of
the American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999 allowing inventors who
would not be filing for protection in a foreign country to have their
application maintained in secrecy throughout its pendency was largely
driven by the independent inventor lobby. 168
Pending legislation, in the form of the Patent Reform Act of 2005,
contains a very different prior art provision than the current U.S. stan-
dard, but it does retain the one-year grace period. 169 Various
modifications to the language of the bill have been proposed, includ-
ing one called the "Coalition Draft" from the Coalition for 21st Century
Patent Law Reform, a group of major U.S. corporations.'" The prior
art provision of this draft would amend § 102 of the Patent Act to pro-
vide, in pertinent part:
102(a): A patent for a claimed invention may not be ob-
tained if—
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or otherwise publicly known—
(A) more than one year before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention; or
loMark Jan is, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 919 (2002).
to See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
170 See generally Coalition For 21st Century Patent Law Reform, Amendment in the Na-
ture of a Substitute to H.R. 2795 Offered by Mr. Smith of Texas (Sept. 1, 2005), hop://
www.fr.com
 / n ews/2005-09-1 tion_b raft. pdf [hereinafter Coalition Draft].
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(B) before the effective filing date of the claimed invention,
other than through disclosures made by the inventor or a
joint inventor or by others who obtained the subject matter
disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint
inventor . . . 171
To implement the opt-in extended grace period for academic re-
searchers, the above provision could be amended to add, for example:
102(b): A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained by an
inventor associated with a small entity as defined in 37 C.ER. 1.9 if
(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed pub-
lication, or otherwise publicly known—
(A) more than two years before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention; or
(B)before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, other than
through disclosures made by the inventor or a joint inventor or by oth-
ers who obtained the subject-matter disclosed directly or indirectly from
the inventor or a joint inventor . . . .
Alternatively, the opt-in provision could be made broadly available to
all applicants by deleting the "associated with a small entity as defined
in 37 C.F.R. 1.9" language, or narrowly tailored to academic research-
ers only by adding the appropriate language.
To take advantage of either provision, eligible applicants would
need to make a notation to that effect in their application at filing. In
addition, 35 U.S.C. § 122(b), which authorizes the publication of pend-
ing patent applications eighteen months after their earliest filing date,
would also be amended to include a new provision, such as:
122(b)(2)(C): Each application for a patent claiming the benefit of
the two-year grace period provided in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) shall be
published promptly after the filing date of such application.
The narrowly tailored opt-in provision, tying the extended grace
period to early publication, would, like the CREATE Act, maintain
Bayh-Dole incentives for university technology transfer while simulta-
neously allowing academic researchers greater freedom to engage in
early and full discourse. 172 The provision also would protect such in-
ventors against third parties trying to patent discoveries already dis-
closed by the inventor. The broader provision hopefully would have
171
 Id. at 2.
172 See supra notes 61-94 and accompanying text.
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the same effect while avoiding the costs associated with attempting to
discriminate between classes of inventors.
In either the broad or the narrow form, this proposal recognizes
the reality that many universities are experiencing an inexorable push
to establish TTOs and secure patents despite the fact that for many
universities, technology transfer is a losing proposition.'" More uni-
versities, faced with dwindling budgets and dazzled by the lure of
blockbuster success stories, are establishing TTOs to generate revenue
from patentable inventions. According to AUTM, nearly all research
universities have established TTOs and the membership of AUTM
keeps growing.'" The 2003 AUTM survey reports:
[0] ne of the themes that emerges—and is reflected in the
increase of AUTM's membership from 1,015 in 1993 when
the first survey was published to 3,155 now—is how the mis-
sion of technology transfer is permeating all parts of acade-
mia. Even the smallest colleges and universities are creating
the infrastructure to translate the fruits of their research into
products that serve the public good.'"
If more and more universities ramp up TTO activities, we can expect
over time to see more delays in disclosures of scientific results across all
technology areas as more university inventors become subsumed in the
patenting culture and feel compelled to comply with its novelty rules.
Should university inventors be able to have their cake (disclose
inventive concepts through discourse) and eat it too (still obtain pat-
ents on their disclosed inventions)? Congress has provided a grace
period to all inventors since 1839 as, according to the U.S. Supreme
Court, "an amelioration in favor of the inventor." 1 '7G Taking the pres-
ence of a grace period as a given in the U.S. system, it would seem the
better question is not one of whether inventors should be able to do
this, but for how long.
When the grace period was first introduced in the Patent Act of
1839, it provided an inventor two years from the first public use or
sale of an invention to file a patent application claiming the inven-
173 Ass'N OE UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 13, at 24-26 (reporting that most Uni-
versities see licensing royalties far below the millions of dollars that a 'mega-license" can
generate).
174 Id. at ix.
175 Id.
17"Andrews v. Hovey (The Driven-Well Cases), 123 U.S. 267,273 (1887).
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don.'" The provision provided new, broader rights for inventors, be-
cause under the previous Act any public use or sale of the later-
patented invention that took place with the inventor's consent before
the filing of a patent application would void the later patent.'" How-
ever, the provision also narrowed inventor rights. Under the prior Act,
even if an invention had been in public use or on sale for a long time
before the inventor filed her patent application, if the uses or sales
had taken place without the inventor's consent, they would not bar
her right to obtain a patent. 179
The Patent Act of 1939, enacted during a period of strong anti-
patent, anti-monopoly sentiment, 18° reduced the grace period from two
years to one year. 181 As explained in the Senate Report accompanying
the Act:
In 1839, when the period of 2 years was first adopted, it may
have been a proper length of time for an inventor to make up
his mind whether or not to file an application for patent. Un-
der present conditions 2 years appears unduly long and oper-
ates as a handicap to industry. Reduction of the period would
serve to bring the date of patenting closer to the time when
the invention is made ....
One year is believed to be a very fair period for all con-
cerned. 182
It seems unlikely that the "all" with whom the Senate was "concerned"
included serious contemplation of university inventors, considering the
relatively miniscule levels of university patenting taking place at the
time. The first university-affiliated TTO was the Wisconsin Alumni Re-
I" Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)).
I" See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119-20 (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103); see also Andrews, 123 U.S. at 273 (calling the 1839 Act "an amelioration in
favor of the inventor, in this respect, of the strict provisions of the act of 1836").
I" See § 7, 5 Stat. at 119-20; see also Andrews, 123 U.S. at 274 (Ile right of an inventor
to obtain a patent was in this respect narrowed, and the rights of the public as against him
were enlarged, by the act of 1839.").
580 See, e.g., MARTIN]. ADELMAN ET AI,., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 13 (2d
ed. 2003) ("The Depression era, with all its sentiments against monopoly, brought with it a
vigorous distrust of patents.").
181 Patent Act of 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212, 1212 (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(h)).
182 S. REP. No. 76-876, at 1 (1939).
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search Foundation ("WARF"), and it had only been formed in 1925. 183
Moreover, Congress likely wanted to "bring the date of patenting closer
to the time when the invention [was] made" because at that time, pat-
ent applications were maintained in secrecy by the USPTO until the
patent issued, which often was many years after the applicatiOn was
filed. There was no eighteen-month publication provision to let third
parties know that an inventor was seeking to patent an invention that
appeared to be in the public domain. The immediate publication as-
pect of the proposed opt-in provision alleviates this concern.
Alternatively, the opt-in system could provide a shorter, eighteen
month grace period. Although a full two-year grace period would be
preferable for academic inventors, eighteen months could be a reason-
able compromise, considering third-party needs for certainty regarding
the proprietary status of publicly disclosed information. Also, a study
comparing changes in early data sharing by university scientists be-
tween 1980 and 1990 seems to indicate support for an eighteen-month
window: "When Bayh-Dole was implemented in 1980, university scien-
tists presented data that were on average 1.37 years from publication.
By 1990, they presented significantly fewer early data, with abstracts be-
ing on average only 0.83 years from publication . "184
The 1980 average of 1.37 years is close to the 1.5 years an eighteen-
month grace period would provide. Moreover, by allowing for immedi-
ate publication of applications, the eighteen-month option should have
a minimal effect on certainty for third parties interested in the proprie-
tary status of such research, since information regarding filed patent
applications would be publicly available sooner. 183
This proposal would not be applicable to every invention a uni-
versity generates, however. To the extent the commercial potential of
an invention is readily apparent, a TTO likely would take steps to ob-
tain patent protection swiftly, without seeking the benefit of an ex-
tended grace period. Also, inventors of pharmaceutical compounds
and other discoveries for which foreign patent protection is important
likely would not take advantage of the extended grace period. 188
 Nev-
1 " MOWERY ET AL, supra note 24, at 39. Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis also
note that "Whe debates over federal patent policy largely ignored U.S. universities during
the 1940s and 1950s.... U.S. universities historically had limited their direct involvement
in patenting and licensing activities." hi. at 87.
184
 Grushcow, supra note 16, at 75.
185
 Because of differing grace period rules outside of the United States, this would be
true only in situations where the applicant is seeking only U.S. patent protection.
185
 Such inventions could begin to take advantage of the one-year grace period if Japan
and the European Union were to adopt it. See infra notes 201-14 and accompanying text.
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ertheless, as one economist notes, "It does not take a high frequency
of occurrence of a problem to impose significant social costs if the
problem emerges for a technology of sufficient importance." 187 This
provision would be most useful for those embryonic ideas that are just
well-defined enough to be dangerous in a patent prior art sense, but
not well defined enough to be clearly commercializable—the kind of
information that traditionally would have been freely shared by re-
searchers before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Extending the printed publication grace period also would pro-
vide a significant benefit to TTOs in their efforts to manage limited
financial resources efficiently. There is a real dollar cost to each pat-
ent application a TTO files." 88
 Moreover, although a TTO may be able
to file numerous provisional applications, if a regular non-provisional
application is not filed within twelve months from the filing date of
the provisional, the provisional application lapses and is essentially
wasted.'"
it is understandable that TTO personnel are pro-patent and seek
to educate researchers about the dangers of disclosure to potential
patent rights. Obtaining patent rights and licensing revenue, however,
are not the only values important to universities, and TTOs must bal-
ance those values against the value of academic discourse and the im-
portance of sharing fundamental information for others to build
upon. This proposal should make it easier for that balancing to take
place by making it easier for researchers to disclose early-stage re-
search results while still retaining the ability to patent downstream
innovations.
Although university TTO reliance on the filing of "quickie" provi-
sional patent applications to preserve patent rights is also understand-
able, it is problematic for several reasons. First, the heightened impor-
tance of the patent specification in claim construction analyses man-
dated by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the recent
Phillips v. AHW Culp. decision puts a premium on well-drafted original
applications.' 90
 While a shotgun approach to filing skimpy provisional
187
 Cohen; supra note 64, at 68.
188
 For a university, the filing fee for a provisional patent application is $100, while
combined filing, search, and examination fees of $500 are required for non-provisional
patent applications. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Fiscal Year 2006 Fee Schedule,
supra note 135; see also 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (1) (2000) (qualifying universities for reduced
fees as small entities).
1110
 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text; see also Silverman, supra note 140, at
88.
190 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
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applications still may result in enforceable patents for universities, the
chances that patents based on such applications will be held invalid or
not infringed is certainly higher now than before that decision. Also,
academic researchers who rely on the filing of provisional applications
for protection before publicly disclosing their work may become disillu-
sioned with the patent process when the TTO does not follow up the
provisional application with a non-provisional application. 191 As such,
they may be .more reluctant to participate in the patent process in the
future, or may alter the focus of their research based on its commer-
cialization potential.
As academic researchers generate more invention disclosures,
TTOs have to make tough decisions about which inventions are wor-
thy of patent protection. According to one 2001 survey of TTOs, "uni-
versities often seek patent protection only when commercial potential
is clear, and this is often not the case for early stage technologies." 192
Moreover, if an invention is developed with federal funds, the univer-
sity must decide whether to take title to it under Bayh-Dole r
 a decision
which brings with it an obligation to attempt to commercialize the
invention. 1 " Dr. Andrew Neighbour, vice chancellor of research at the
University of California, Los Angeles, provides a good assessment of
the process:
If supported with any NIH grants or contracts (or any other
federal agency), the invention will fall under the conditions of
the Bayh-Dole Act requiring that we report the invention and
decide whether or not to elect title and file for intellectual
property protection through the US Patent and Trademark
Office. To arrive at this decision, the TTO must exercise pro-
fessional judgment based on a scientific, technical, and busi-
ness assessment to determine the commercial viability of the
invention. Is it a profound scientific breakthrough with no
commercial utility? Is it perhaps, simply a better mousetrap
for which there is no market need? Or perhaps it is so new,
that there are no comparable products in the market....
ITlechnology transfer is not a straightforward process ... . 194
Considering the early stage of most university technologies when
they reach the TTO and the fact that TTOs seldom have enough !kens-
19 ' See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
192 Thursby et al., supra note 127, at 68.
193 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c) (5), 203(a) (1) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
194 From the Bench to the Bedside, supra note 12, at 57 (statement of Dr. Andrew Neighbour).
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ing personnel to evaluate all invention disclosures thoroughly, 195 it is
not surprising that many provisional applications are not followed up
with regular patent application fiiings. 196 Dr. Neighbour further noted:
A certain medical school dean once asked me why we didn't
only patent "the good ones." Because many University inven-
tions are so unrefined and untested, it is difficult to deter-
mine with certainty the future path for the majority of the
inventions that faculty researchers disclose. 197
Allowing the patenting decision to be made further along in the
research cycle should enable TTOs to better assess commercial poten-
tial and avoid filing provisional applications that will never be sup-
ported through to patenting, as is described in the following scenario:
Felicia is a Ph.D. student who published some early, non-enabling
(she believes) results of her research almost one year ago and is now
approaching the deadline for filing a provisional application to
avoid the use by the USPTO of her early publication in an obvious-
ness rejection over her later work. Felicia's research is still not far
enough along for the iTO to make a firm assessment of its commer-
cial potential, and she is having difficulty convincing the TTO to
file an application, yet she does not have the funds to try to prosecute
the application herself. She feels sure that in a few more months, she
will have strong results that would justify patent protection. 198
Like Peter, Felicia could benefit from some additional time to decide
whether to file a provisional application.
TTOs, the inventors they work with, and the larger scientific
community would be better served by both a longer total grace period
for those inventions that would still have meaningful value without
foreign patent protection, and a true one-year grace period (which
would require adoption by Japan and the European Union) for those
inventions, like pharmaceuticals, for which both foreign and U.S. pat-
195 See Thursby et al., supra note 127, at 66 (noting that a number of TEO professionals
reported having insufficient staff to determine the commercial potential of disclosed in-
ventions).
196 For example, the Georgia Institute of Technology's Office of Technology Licensing
reports that for the past four years the office has filed more than three times as many pro-
visional patent applications as non-provisionals. Technology Licensing Statistics, TECH. TRANS-
FER BUZZ (Ga. Tech Research Corp., Office of Tech. Licensing, Atlanta, Ga.), Fall 2009, at
8, available at http://otl.gtrc.gatech.edu/OTL_Fall2004.pdf.
197
 From the Bench to the Bedside, supra note 12, at 57 (statement of Dr. Andrew Neighbour).
198 Based on an actual incident. Names and identifying features have been changed.
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ent protection are critical. In each case, the grace period should then
be followed by the filing of a rigorously drafted application based on a
better assessment of the invention's commercial potential.
Why do we care if university researchers are able to file for patents?
First, as has already been noted, although some inventions will be
commercialized without patents, many technologies will not be com-
mercialized without the assurance (or at least the strong potential) of
proprietary rights. 1° Because university-generated research is often in
the early stages of development at the point at which it is licensed, pat-
ents can provide the necessary incentive for inventors to continue de-
veloping the discovery, often in conjunction with an industry partner. 20°
For some, creating the option of an expanded grace period will
seem too radical; for others, it will appear too tame. As an opt-in provi-
sion, however, it simply is designed to inject needed flexibility into the
system to allow academic researchers to act upon the impulses that are
in society's best interest, without destroying their own interests. With-
out such a provision, the likelihood of increasing academic discourse in
the current university patenting environment is virtually non-existent.
B. Caveats and Concerns
Some may question whether university inventors should receive
special treatment in the patent system. The answer is they should not,
unless the special treatment will inure to the public good. Provisions
such as 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (1), which allows universities to pay reduced
patent filing and prosecution fees, the CREATE Act, and even the
Bayh-Dole Act, express a belief that facilitating the patenting of inven-
tions by universities, as well as university interaction with industry, will
ultimately benefit society at large. The proposals outlined above
pragmatically acknowledge this belief and seek to ameliorate some of
the negative side effects of this policy decision on academic discourse
and scientific knowledge sharing ; These proposals do, however, pres-
ent some challenges.
1. Foreign Proprietary Rights
Since at least as early as the 1967 Report of the President's Commission
on Patent Reform, there have been sporadic efforts to pass legislation that
199
 Nelson, supra note 26, at 15.
200 See Thursby & Thursby, supra note 48, at 93 (noting that most inventions licensed by
TTOs require further development, often with the aid of a faculty researcher).
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would convert the U.S. from a first-to-invent regime to a first-inventor-
to-file ("FITF") regime.20 ' A move to FITF would create a "race" to the
patent office in the sense that whichever true inventor filed first would
be entitled to the patent. This move would bring the U.S. into harmony
with the other major patent-granting organizations, the European Pat-
ent Office ("EPO") and the Japanese Patent Office ("JPO"), on the is-
sue of priority.202
 The current legislative effort, part of the Patent Re-
form Act of 2005, was introduced in the spring of 2005 by Rep. Lamar
Smith (R-Tex.). 205 If enacted, that legislation would eliminate priority
disputes in the USPTO and courts, since the time of invention would
no longer be relevant. The first inventor to file a patent application
covering the claimed invention would be entitled to the resulting pat-
en t. 2°4
Although the Patent Reform Act contains some provisions to aid
global patent harmonization, 205
 the opt-in extended prior art grace pe-
riod proposed in this Article would put the U.S. even further out of
step with its global counterparts. The USPTO, EPO, and JPO account
for 89% of patents worldwide.206
 The JPO has a general six-month
grace period, but the EPO operates on an absolute novelty basis, with
only limited exceptions for certain types of disclosures occurring within
six months of the application filing date—quite different from the
grace period provided in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 207
2°1 See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 90-5, at 14 (1967). In 1992 alone, two bills
were introduced for that purpose: S. 2605, 102d Cong. (1992), and H.R. 4978, 102d C.ong.
(1992). This legislation was debated but not enacted. See 43 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. 519, 519 (1992).
2°2 See European Patent Convention art. 54, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268; Tokkyohei
[Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, translated at http://www.wipoint/clea/docs_new/en/
jp/jp006en.html.
202
 Patent Reform Act of 2005,1-1R 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
204 H.R. 2795 § 3.
202
 In addition to instituting FITT, House Bill 2795 would eliminate other oddities of U.S.
patent law, including the best mode requirement and prior art provisions discounting inven-
tive activity occurring outside of the United States. See H.R. 2795 § 3(d) (repeal of require-
ments for inventions made abroad); id. § 4(d) (eliminating best mode requirements).
2°6
 EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT: 2003 EDITION, at 5 (2003), available at http://
www.trilateral.net/tsr/tsr_2003/2003tscpdf.
2°7 The European Patent Convention (the "EPC") only provides a narrow six-month
grace period for disclosures resulting from an "evident abuse" or display in a qualified
international exhibition. European Patent Convention, supra note 202, at an 55. Moreo-
ver, the grace period dates from the filing of the actual European patent application, not a
priority application, effectively eliminating the benefit of the grace period for foreign ap-
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The vigorous debate in the European Patent Organization over
the issue of establishing even a one-year grace period suggests a pro-
posal for a longer period would meet with significant resistance. 2°8
According to Mr. Jan Galama, a European industry representative and
author of a position paper against the adoption of a grace period in
Europe, "If scientists, universities, ,
 etc. wished to become players in the
economic world, they would have to disregard some old habits."209
Europe, however, may yet be induced to institute a one-year grace
period, which would breathe new life into the nominal one-year grace
period of § 102(b) that U.S. inventors seeking foreign protection sim-
ply cannot take advantage of currently. In a detailed opinion counter-
ing the view of Mr. Galama, Dr. Joseph Strauss of the Max Plank Insti-
tute argued for the adoption of a general grace period noting in par-
ticular the needs of academic researchers:
A further fact and the actual reason for the entire evalua-
tion of the possible introduction of a grace period into the
EPC may also not be overlooked: The role and importance of
academic and other non-industrial research institutions for innova-
tion, as well as for the progress and well-being of the society at large.
It should be beyond doubt that in view of their double, or
even triple role (education, generation and dissemination of
knowledge), they are in need of a fine tuned legal treatment,
securing at the same time early publication, in their own and
the society's, including industry, interests, and, on the other
plicants who choose to take advantage of the Paris Convention right of priority after filing
a first application in their home country. See Case G 03/98, Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Smith-
Kline Beecham Biologicals SA, 2001 E.P.O.R. 33 (EPO Enlarged Bd. App. 2000), available
at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/g980003exl.pdf. The Japanese Patent
Act also provides a six-month grace period that covers the same items as the EPC provision
as well as disclosures made by the patent applicant. See Tokkyohii [Patent Law], Law No.
121 of 1959.
268 See JAN E.M. GALAMA, EXPERT OPINION ON THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE INTRO-
DUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 11-14 (2000), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/info/pdf/galama.pclf
 (arguing against the
introduction of a grace period in the European patent system); see also Comm'n of the
European Communities, An Assessment of the Implications for Basic Genetic Engineering Research
of Failure to Publish, or Late Publication of Papers on Subjects Which Could Be Patentable as Re-
quired Under Article 16(b) of Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inven-
tions, at 15, COM (2002) 2 final (Jan. 14, 2002) (noting industry opposition to introduc-
tion of a grace period in the European patent system), available at http://europa.eu.int/
eur-lex/en/conn/rpt/2002/com2002_0002en01.pdf.
2°9
 GALAMA, supra note 208, at 23.
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hand, the appropriation of their research results by the in-
struments of intellectual property, in particular patents.'"2"
As a report discussing Dr. Strauss's analysis further noted:
It is not only inventors who suffer whenever a useful inven-
tion is excluded from patent protection but society at large.
Statistics from Japan, US and Germany make clear that early
disclosure is of particular importance for academic/research
institutions and independent inventors and the needs of this
sector should be given more recognition in Europe. 211
Many European countries had grace period provisions before
joining the European Patent Convention, and many still retain vary-
ing types of grace periods. 212
 Moreover, the Patent Reform Act of 2005
contains an incentive for Europe and Japan to adopt a one-year grace
period: until they do, foreign inventors will not be able to take advan-
tage of the U.S. grace period when filing U.S. applications based on
earlier-filed foreign applications. 213
In fact, the experience of the European Union, where no mean-
ingful grace period currently is available, provides a clear example of
the importance of extending grace in the university context. One in-
210
 JOSEPH STRAUSS, EXPERT OPINION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE PERIOD IN
EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 77 (2000), available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/
news/info/pdf/straus.pdf. Dr. Strauss also noted that even though industry in Europe is
vigorously opposed to a grace period, in Japan, where the grace period must be invoked,
47% of patent applications invoking the grace period were filed by large companies. Id. at
39. He also noted the greater significance of the grace period to independent and aca-
demic inventors, since the grace period was invoked in 43% of all of their applications. Id.
211 See Comm'n of the European Communities, supra note 208, at 18.
See IPR Helpdesk, supra note 101, at 3-4 (describing grace periods in Portugal,
Spain, Russia, China, Canada, Japan, and other countries).
213
 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 10(h) (2005). The provision
reads:
Before the date, if ever, that the Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office publishes a notice in the Official Gazette of the Office de-
claring that both the European Patent Convention and the patent laws of Ja-
pan afford inventors seeking patents a 1-year period prior to the effective
filing date of a claimed invention during which disclosures made by the in-
ventor or by others who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or in-
directly from the inventor do not constitute prior art, the term "effective
filing date" as used in section 102(a) (1) (A) of title 35, United States Code,
shall be construed by disregarding any right of priority, except that provided
under section 119(e) of title 35, United States Code.
Id.
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tellectual property guide aimed at the European research community
notes:
In order to contribute to scientific discourse and not to en-
danger the success of their publications, researchers often fol-
low the traditional strategy of a quick publication. Questions
of commercial exploitation—if they are considered at all—are
usually secondary. This leads to situations where researchers
often overlook the fact that the prompt and ill-considered dis-
tribution of an invention without a previous patent applica-
tion will cause the complete and irremediable loss of all pat-
ent rights, and, finally, the fundamental limitation of eco-
nomic usability. This is one of the main reasons why the
inventions generated at universities [in Europe] .. are rarely
patented, although they are often valuable and exploitable. 214
Such commentary, combined with the increasing importance of univer-
sity-industry technology transfer and the lure of beneficial treatment
under U.S. law for European and Japanese inventors, may yet result in
the expansion of grace periods abroad.
2. Trading Costs
Using patent policy to facilitate the transfer of technology out of
universities has imposed significant costs on academic discourse over
the past several years. Thus it is not surprising that extending the grace
period in order to improve academic discourse likely will entail costs as
well, both for third parties and for university inventors. Costs to third
parties could include increased uncertainty regarding the availability of
publicly disclosed information for use free from proprietary claims.
Even with immediate application publication, extending the grace pe-
riod to a total of eighteen or twenty-four months from the first filing
date means that third parties may have to wait an additional six to
twelve months before seeing initial application claims. This is because a
provisional application, which is often the first filed application, is not
required to include claims. 215
 This may not be a major disadvantage,
however, because claims often change significantly during prosecution
" 4
 IPR Helpdesk, supra note 101, at 1-2. In the meantime, the fact that only 13% of
new patent applications filed by AUTM respondents in FY 2004 were foreign applications
suggests that amending U.S. law to include an optional extended grace period will still be
beneficial for academic inventors. See ASSN OF UNW. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 1, at 16.
215 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
601(b) (2) (8th ed. 2005).
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and beyond. In fact, patentees are even allowed to broaden claims up
to two years after a patent issues.216 Moreover, as a result of the Phillips
decision,217 applicants may begin to include claims in provisional appli-
cations to aid arguments of adequate claim support in the event of fu-
ture litigation.218
One of the policy justifications for tying the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) bar
to patentability to an applicant's filing date is that it prevents inventors
from commercializing their inventions for long periods of time before
seeking patent protection. 219 In the absence of such a provision, inven-
tors could, in effect, extend their term of exclusivity by marketing the
invention for several years and then filing a patent application only
when competition developed. Thus, unintended costs to the public of
extending the grace period as proposed above are that such an ex-
tended grace period would delay the entry of the patented invention
into the public domain and could create the opportunity for inventors
to receive up to an extra year of commercial exclusivity before filing a
patent application. A seemingly simple solution to these unintended
consequences would be to subtract a year from the term of patents issu-
ing on inventions benefiting from the expanded grace period. Such a
solution may make sense in conjunction with the broadly drafted pro-
posal; however, it likely would create disincentives for inventors to use
the opt-in provision. Because the inventors the provision is designed to
aid—academic researchers—are more likely to be engaged in early-
stage research that they lack the capacity to commercialize, the risk of
extended commercialization should be very low under the narrowly
drafted proposal. Nevertheless, these are additional potential costs of
the proposals that must be balanced against the expected gains.
For university inventors, the costs of opting in to the extended
grace period could include less overall patent protection, as a result of
either eliminated foreign rights or the efforts of third parties to pat-
ent variations of earlier-disclosed technology. An extended grace pe-
riod may increase the chances that a third party, aware of the disclo-
216 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
2" See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
218 See Crouch, supra note 144, 1 2 (describing the importance of including claims in
provisional applications in light of Phillips' changes to claim construction).
218 See, e.g., Baxter v. Cobe Labs, 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Tone Bros., Inc. v.
Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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sure, may seek to obtain a patent on the disclosed subject matter in
advance of the true inventor. 225
Under the current U.S. patent system, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) prevents
the patenting of inventions by other than a true inventor who actually
conceived of the claimed invention. 221 Although a form of this re-
quirement would remain even if the United States changes to a FITF
regime as proposed in the Patent Reform Act, 222 third parties may be
able to file applications on improvements of earlier-disclosed technol- .
ogy in advance of university applicants, thus potentially limiting the
scope of subject matter the university researcher ultimately could have
patented. If, however, a "Coalition Draft"-type provision were enacted,
the potential for such third-party activity would be greatly minimized,
since prior public disclosure of claimed subject matter would bar third
parties from patenting it. 225
Moreover, even without the protection envisioned in the Coalition
Draft, there is no guarantee the university researcher would have con-
ceived the same improvements as a third-party inventor. Consequently,
the public ultimately would benefit in both of these scenarios because
more information would have been injected into the public domain in
accordance with the original academic mission. As Professor Eisenberg
wisely notes: "Patents undoubtedly have a critical role to play in facilitat-
ing technology transfer in some contexts. But they can also interfere
with technology transfer and with the broader goal of promoting con-
tinuing technological progress. These goals may sometimes be better
served by allocating new knowledge to the public domain."224
3. Unresolved Issues
Unfortunately, extending the prior art grace period will not neces-
sarily impact the other important factor driving secrecy in scientific
academic research: disclosure restrictions in industry sponsorship
agreements.225
 According to one 2001 survey, half of the research-
22° University research, however, is generally early-stage research requiring years of de-
velopment before it is commercializable. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. If an
invention appeared to be close to commercialization (making it an attractive candidate for
third-party "stealth patenting"), a university likely would not wait two years to file an appli-
cation and simply would bypass the opt-in provisions.
221
 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 (2000).
222
 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
223
 See Coalition Draft, supra note 170, § 3 (b) (1).
224 Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1727.
r2.5
 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1363 ("The potential for corruption of aca-
demic values is manifest in research sponsored by industry and by the Department of De-
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sponsoring companies surveyed include disclosure restrictions in 90%
of such agreements. 226
 The restrictive terms may preclude a researcher
from publicly disclosing research results before and several months af-
ter the filing of a patent application covering the discovery. Conse-
quently, absent other changes to such agreements, an extended grace
period would not benefit researchers bound by contract to limit or de-
lay disclosures.
Although industry sponsorship is important, it accounts for only
a small portion of the research funds U.S. universities receive. The
federal government provides 60% of university funding while industry
funding provides just 6%. 227
 However, some industry-university re-
search collaboration agreements include disclosure restrictions even
though the collaboration is supported by federal funding. 228 Amend-
ing Bayh-Dole to bar such restrictions on outputs created with the use
of federal funds could provide an additional incentive to increase
prompt scientific discourse by members of the academy.
Although relying on universities to forsake patenting and spon-
sored research for the sake of academic discourse may be unrealistic,
there is a role for university administrators to play in reestablishing the
primacy of knowledge-sharing norms. Institutional policymakers can
also choose to bar overly restrictive disclosure provisions in industry
sponsorship agreements. The Statement on Academic Freedom, drafted
during the first annual Global Colloquium of University Presidents
Fense. These sponsors often have a palpable interest in directing the choice of research
topics and restricting the publication of research results."); Walsh & Hong, supra note 16,
at 802 (discussing the rise of secrecy among academic scientists over the past thirty years).
228
 Thursby & Thursby, supra note 48, at 93.
222 See ASS • N OF' UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 13, at 13-14; see also Risa L. Lie-
berwitz, Confronting the Privitization and Commercialization of Academic Research: An Analysis of
Social Implications at the Local, National, and Global Levels, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL. S -ron.
109, 123 (2005) ("Given the continued dominant role of federal funding to support aca-
demic research, the Bayli-Dole Act remains the most important instrument for encourag-
ing universities to increase their market activities through patents and licenses of publicly
funded research results."). According to the 2003 AUTM survey, the balance of research
funding comes from state and local governments, foundations, individuals, and the univer-
sities themselves. See AWN or UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 13, at 14. Although rela-
tively low compared to federal funding, industry funding levels have increased significantly
over the past few decades—in 1970, the share of university research funding provided by
industry was only 2.6%. Cohen et al., supra note 152, at 183. Actual industry funding, how-
ever, may be higher because the above numbers may not reflect all sources of industry
support, such as "in kind" contributions of laboratory equipment. See ASS'N OF UNIV. TECH.
MANAGERS, supra note 13, at 13-14.
228
 Wesley M. Cohen & John Walsh, Public Research, Patents and Implications for In-
dustrial R&D in the Drug, Biotechnology, Semiconductor and Computer Industries 3
(Aug. 2000) (working paper, on file with author).
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held at Columbia University in January 2005, seems to provide a man-
date for such action to be taken by universities as it states:
Academic institutions bear a heavy responsibility to protect
the scholars and students who work with them from improper
pressures .... Universities must maintain and encourage
freedom of inquiry, discourse, teaching, research, and publi-
cation, and they must protect all members of the academic
staff and student body against external and internal
influences that might restrict the exercise of these free-
doms. 229
University action to facilitate scientific academic discourse would be a
welcome addition to the extended grace period proposals because pat-
ent law rules do not operate in a vacuum and the ultimate impact of
implementing the proposals can only be surmised. Just as the full ef-
fects of Bayh-Dole could not be envisioned at the time of its enactment,
so the full effects of these proposals cannot be anticipated with cer-
tainty ex ante. What seems certain is that without some relaxation in
patent rules here and abroad, disclosure norms will continue to dete-
riorate as the technology transfer boom expands to more and more
universities.
CONCLUSION
Academic freedom does not exist for its own sake; it exists in the interests of
advancing scholarly inquiry. There is a reciprocal and mutually reinforc-
ing relationship between academic freedom and scholarly inquiry, and those
who care about preserving academic freedom—which presumably includes
all of us—should be very careful to identify forces which diminish or un-
dermine scholarly enquiry tsid . 23°
For good or ill, patent law and policy and university technology
transfer are inextricably linked. The Bayh-Dole and CREATE acts pro-
vide clear examples of Congress choosing to facilitate technology
229
 Report of the First Global ColloquiUm of University Presidents, Statement on Aca-
demic Freedom 18 (May 26, 2005), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/president/communi-
cations%20files/giobalcolloquium.htm . Hosting responsibilities for the Colloquium will
rotate among Columbia University, the University of Pennsylvania, New York University,
Princeton University, and Yale University, the five sponsoring institutions. Id.1 2.
23° Peter MacKinnon, Administering and Protecting Academic Freedom, in PURSUING ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM: "FREE AND FEARLESS"? 37, 40 (Len M. Findley & Paul M. Bidwell eds.,
2001).
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transfer policy through patent law. Conversely, the patent policy in
effect as a result of the In re Klopfenstein decision (as expounded
through the Federal Circuit's statutory interpretation) has the poten-
tial to chill further the pre-patent dissemination of academic research
and hamper innovation.23 ' The statutory amendments I am proposing
would allow Congress to facilitate university technology transfer con-
sistent with the Bayh-Dole and CREATE acts while ameliorating some
of the problems created by the blending of patent law with the aca-
demic enterprise.
Will extending the prior art grace period combined with early
application publication resolve all of the conflicts surrounding uni-
versity-industry technology transfer? Of course not. Are these tools
that can alleviate some of those tensions? I believe so. Just as changes
in patent law and policy largely created the growth and growing pains
of technology transfer, further changes in patent law can be expected
to have meaningful effects on the future of technology transfer in
ways that cannot fully be predicted.
In order to optimize the patent system's ability to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, the "one-size-fits-all" approach
must give way to the realities of the changing technology creation land-
scape. As its name implies, an extended grace period will bestow un-
merited favor on researchers choosing to take advantage of it; they will
receive "grace" without having done anything to deserve it. 232 But if
that extension of "grace" can serve the larger societal goals of increas-
ing academic discourse and knowledge dissemination within the acad-
emy while enhancing the transfer of technology outside of those ivory
walls, the resulting benefits will be nothing short of "amazing."
"I See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1395, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009); supra notes 19-23 and
accompanying text.
232 They will, however, have to agree to immediate application publication. See supra
notes 163-200 and accompanying text.
